An Explanation

[AKM 0]

My apologies to the Moderators if this is in the wrong area. I don't think there's been anything along these lines posted in these fora yet.

So, without further ado:

Preface:

The point behind this document is not to be an all-inclusive view into the Russian Military and its doctrines, but to briefly explain the purpose behind various units. It can be strange to see Motor-Rifle troops deploying in a VDV DShG role.

There are two major branches that we will be dealing with, the Regular Forces and the MVD, which is the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

We will start with the Regular Forces.

- Motor Rifle Troops are the Mechanized/Motorized Infantry. Operating alongside Armour units, they support and are supported by the tankers. Various terms such as "Mahra" and "Motostrelok" are alternative names for these units. Their equipment tends to be rather heavy, and they're not expected to operate seperate from their APC or IFV for any significant length of time. In Afghanistan, it was found that when the Motor Rifle troops had to disembark their vehicles and attack up slopes, the Mujahideen would be able to easily escape. This led to the increased use of VDV and Mountain Infantry units. It would seem that the Motostrelokii commonly deploy with a large number of heavy weapons, including NSV, AGS-17, and 82mm mortars. The Motor-Rifles operate in a assault role, primarily.

- VDV, the Vozdushno-Desantnye Voyska, are Russia's Airborne troops. They are an elite unit, tasked with parachute and air-assault / air-mobile operations. Besides being parachute qualified, they also form the core of DShG (Formerly DShB) or Desantno-Shturmovaya Gruppa (Formerly Desantno - Shturmovaya Brigada), the Air-Assault troops who would deploy via Mi-24, Mi-8, Ka-60, etc. There are several anecdotes attributed to the VDV, and these are well respected troops. A distinguishing feature is the light blue-striped Telnyashka undershirt and the Blue Beret. One anecdote is as follows: Two Militsiya (Policemen) are walking their patrol route when they see a drunken "Desantnik" on leave. One turns to the other and says: "You go first, try to arrest him, and then I'll avenge you."

- Naval Infantry are the Marines of the Russian Federation (And former Soviet Union). They are probably the best regular troops available to the Russians, highly trained, motivated, and well equipped, needless to say, an elite on par with the VDV. They're typically used as "shock troops," used to bash their way ashore and fight through enemy defensive lines. They wear the black beret, but their distinguishing feature is a Red Circle with a Gold Anchor inside it. Naval Infantry (Morskaya Pexhota / MORPEH) are also parachute qualified and are often seen deploying in an air-assault role as well, though to my knowledge they do not form a part of the DShG.

Roman Stepanov has this to say about the Naval Infantry:

"Our Naval Infantry is one of the most respected crowds in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. I would have to say even in Soviet times. Morskaya Pexhota were always respected a lot. "Black Death" is what the Chechens called our Black Berets during Dudaev's regime. When the Caspian Regiment was taking his palace in 1995, most of the Chechens chose death instead of fighting our legendary Naval Infantry. There is evidence, some of which is recorded on video, showing Chechens jumping off the buildings. They chose death instead of face to face combat with the Black Berets. The anchor emblem is the most important thing in their lives. Black Beret and the Anchor!"

- Spetsnaz come in a variety of flavours. The original (and "only") Spetsnaz unit are those formed by the GRU, used much as the SAS would be. They conduct assassinations, raids deep behind enemy lines, sabotage, reconnaissance, and similar tasks. These are the GRU SpN. Naval SpN operate in a similiar fashion. During Soviet times, most SpN could be identified (those operating alongside Airborne units) by the lack of a "Guards" patch, which was worn by nearly all VDV Regiments as they had earned the honourific during the Great Patriotic War (WWII). However, Naval Spetsnaz wore the uniform and insignia of the Naval Infantry and thusly could not be identified in such an easy manner. The Naval Spetsnaz have retained their secrecy, and little is known of them.

From personal discussions with a GRU SpN man who would prefer not to be named at the moment, the Naval Spetsnaz are "frightening motherfuckers, very skilled."

It should be noted that Spetsnaz is an abbreviated term which means "Special Purpose." Spetsnaz, and the abbreviation SpN, are often used to denote units which are not used in the above described roles, and has become a sort of "one size fits all" term for any Russian Special Forces unit. The Spetsnaz units released by RHS at the time of writing (GRU & Naval) operate with the Military, not the MVD.

--

During the fall of the Soviet Union and the effective collapse of Russia over the course of the 1990s, the MVD became especially confusing, to the point that even OMON officers had no idea what their actual tasking was beyond the mission they had been assigned. Several conflicting opinions on what each unit is tasked to do exist, and it is my current goal to briefly explain the purposes behind each. In all honesty, OMON and OMSN are practically interchangeable in terms of the missions they conduct.

The MVD is tasked with counter-terrorism, combating narcotics traffic, and internal security. In addition to the special operations teams it has control over, the MVD also has a "Second Military," complete with Armour, Artillery, and Aviation. The same goes for the Border Guard force, who don't have to be covered in-depth here. The MVD were assigned to operate inside Chechnya alongside Regular Forces, and because of some friendly fire incidents and a high level of corruption (for the time) the Regular Forces considered them to be second-rate troops, barely capable of even basic tasks. This however did not extend to OMON or OMSN.

OMON, or Otryad Militsii Osobogo Naznacheniye, means "Special Purpose Police Detatchment." These troops have a variety of tasks, and have operated in Chechnya. In addition to working with civilians and the police force, they can be used to secure the rear echelons of Regular Force units, and in Chechnya, are often seen manning checkpoints. Typically there is an OMON unit per major city and province in the Russian Federation. OMON are sometimes referred to as "Black Berets," although it would seem that they've stopped doing that as of late.

OMSN, or Otryad Militsii Spetsialnogo Naznacheniye, meaning "Special Operations Police Team." They are more highly professional than OMON, consisting of higher-ranking police officers, and OMSN detatchments have seen service in Chechnya. They are also assigned counterterrorist duties and have recieved advanced training and equipment. OMSN are derived from SOBR (SOBR - Spetsialniye Otryadii Bystrogo Ryeagiprovaniya. [special Rapid Reaction Unit]), which was reformed in 2002 as OMSN.

An operation for OMON or OMSN/SOBR troops may be, for example, to raid an arms deal site and arrest or kill all involved and recover the black market weaponry, raid a drug cache or manufacturing site, or conduct high risk arrest warrants, for example trying to arrest a higher-ranking member of the Russian Mafia.

By comparison, Vityaz units - often the word is capitalized, although it is not an acronym - belong to the Military Police. They are a special operations unit, sometimes subordinated to work with the MVD. Vityaz means "Knight." Examples of operations that they would conduct would be securing rear areas, engaging enemy special forces units (For example, a located SAS unit), and assisting in the reduction of any stragglers. Example operations would include, to use OFP CWC examples, hunting down David Armstrong during the American retreat from Everon, or for example, conducting a night attack on Cancon during the "Lost Squad" MP Cooperative mission with the aim of killing or capturing the enemy troops there.

--

Marks of elite formations, besides the obvious insignias, are things such as the Telnyashka striped undershirt. It was originally a Naval item of wear, consisting of dark blue horizontal stripes on a white background, where the blue represented the ocean's water and the white the foam of the white-cap waves, unless you were part of a Northern Fleet in which case the white was the ice. When the Navy re-trained some personnel to form Naval Infantry detatchments, they fought in their Telnyashkas (Russian Plural: Telnyashkii) underneath their Army uniforms, if they didn't fight in their Naval uniforms.

When the VDV were being formed up in WWII, in order to give the troops courage and confidence in their abilities, it was ordered that they would wear the Telnyashka as well. The VDV eventually managed to distinguish themselves sufficiently that the Naval Infantry and Navy stopped resenting this, which was also helped when they switched to a Light Blue and White pattern, insteady of the Navy Blue. For the VDV, the blue and white is the blue of the sky and the white of the clouds.

Several variations of Telnyashkii exist, including black-striped and even a red-striped version. These seem to have faded from use.

--

In closing it's sufficient to say that the Russians, the MVD especially can be very confusing. This document however should have given you a better understanding of the purposes of various units and a measure of their history and prestige. Credits to Mr. Roman Stepanov and .COMmunist as well as others who wish to remain unnamed for the time being.

Regards,

- AK

--

EDIT: 01-12-06 / 02-12-06.

FSB Special Operations Units.

As you may have noticed, recently another RHS release was made, this time involving FSS / FSB SOC units. In transliterated Russian: Centr Spetsial'nogo Naznacheniya Federal'noy Sluzhbiy Bezopasnosti. (Federal Security Service Special Operations Command.) As mentioned in the readme, the two major (well, best known) units under FSS/FSB SOC authority are "ALFA" and "VYMPEL."

"Alfa" is the premier counter-terrorist unit in the Russian Federation. Originally designated "Group A" and authorized by Yuri Andropov on 28 July of 1974, it was later referred to as "Alfa" by many following the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

This unit has taken part in the vast majority of hostage rescue operations since its formation. However, Provincal (Oblast) and even city authorities have the final say on which team is used; when local OMON or less often, OMSN units are deployed, we find that they do not perform as well as the FSS Alfa, sometimes tragically resulting in the deaths of hostages or friendly units.

Alfa consists entirely of Commissioned Officers (Lieutenant and above) from the KGB, and later FSB/FSS. The unit contains underwater demolition specialists, snipers, negotiators, psychologists, and the like. During Soviet times, Alfa deployed regional subunits, which later became the leading counterterrorist elements in those nations at the breakup of the Soviet Union.

-

Vympel can be translated to mean many things. I find the most appropriate translation is "Banner," although "Pennant" also works nicely. Sometimes this is also translated as "Flag."

To clarify what the strangely translated section of the FSS SOC readme says, the primary duties of VYMPEL and the history thereof is as follows:

Primary tasks are to conduct reconnaissance and subversive operations, engage in counterinsurgency and counterterrorist warfare domestically and abroad, protect important personnel and train in their evacuation (IE: Protecting Ambassadors, etc), capturing strategically vital objectives during wartime (Example: Nuclear Power facilities), assisting in the protection of strategically important facilities in the Soviet Union / Russian Federation, all while working in close cooperation with the KGB and GRU.

During the Soviet-Afghan war, VYMPEL units conducted intelligence gathering and sabotage raids. They have infiltrated Mujahideen groups, conducted "subversive operations" (Example: Turning one band of guerillas against another) and freed captives held by the Mujahideen.

In 1991, as the Soviet Union dissolved, "Vympel" was assigned an additional task: Should a strategically important facility be captured by terrorists or other irregular forces, it would be their job to re-secure it.

As an interesting note, VYMPEL conducted a training exercise alongside KGB elements, acting as the Opposition Force. The units defending the targetted objectives were given some, or no warning of an impending attack in order to test readiness and proeficiency.

VYMPEL usually conducted mock attacks on several objectives simultaneously. Missions included reconnaissance, securing samples of sensitive technology, kidnapping important personnel, "destroying" rail-heads, missile silos, etc, and other such tasks.

Reportedly the training was a complete success with everyone involved gaining a tremendous boon of experience.

If you've read this far, then you know how the units are used now. Go forth and make some kickass missions.

Regards,

- AK

[sanctuary 19]

Very nice reading.

Can be very usefull when you want to create missions that have more realistic troops deployment, and which one fits more to certain mission situations.

[hellfish6 7]

Great post!

[Sennacherib 0]

thx for all these informations.

[JdB 151]

I remember this from the old RHS forums

[-Snafu- 78]

That's cleared up a lot of questions about the Russian military I had, thanks.

[Meathead 0]

thx that helped this yankee alot

[Supernova 0]

this helps me clarify a few things about the mighty motherland.

[CameronMcDonald 146]

Good stuff, AKM. Nice read.

[AKM 0]

Thanks for your comments. If you happen to have any other questions I can attempt to answer them here.

If you have any comments or things you believe I got wrong, bring it up politely, please, and try to provide sources, as I usually end up using things like this as a impromptu reference for when I end up writing articles.

[CameronMcDonald 146]

What is the typical loadout of a motorised infantry squad, weapons-wise? I think someone had answered this before, it might have been you, but I can't find the present location.

Just curious as to distribution of RPGs, RPKs, GP25/30s, etc.

[AKM 0]

I am not sure of what the TO&E says. Every time I find one of those handy little files it seems to date back to either the Second World War or the Soviet-Afghan war.

From what I see and hear, talking to various people, analyzing various things, it would seem that PKM is carried rather frequently, even by light troops. I guess they figure it's not that heavy - it'd be the equivalent of toting a FN-MAG/58, as you well know, Cameron McDonald.

It looks like the typical arrangement for Motor Rifles involves two GP-30, two RPK or a PKM and an RPK, and either an RPG-7V and a lot of guys carrying rounds, or plenty of RPG-18 / -22 / other single-shot launchers. A rather large number of troops seem to be fitting PSO-type optics to their rifles now, the RPK often sees use as a "Designated Marksman Weapon" with a PSO-1 fitted.

[CameronMcDonald 146]

RPK as a DM weapon? Interesting. The other revelation there is that the PKM is still making the rounds up front, I thought it had dropped out of squads in place of the RPK and was languishing back in company level. Shows how much I know.  

Another question: what kind of setup are the Motostrelokii using regarding RTOs and combat medics?

- EDIT: Fixed. Ta again.

[AKM 0]

Motostrelokii. That extra R there takes some work to get out of the habit of using, aye.

The RTO and Medics seem to be languishing at the Platoon level. Same with a fellow who carries the SVD or SVD-S, as of late. It also seems that they'll be attached to the squads as required by a mission, but at the moment I cannot speak with absolute certainty, nothing seems solid when it comes to the Russians and their TO&E. I've got one guy telling me he only sees one or two RPKs and no PKMs with the squads, but another guy saying: "Fuck, we never go out in the field without our PKM." So it seems to be a mixture of the two.

Then again, the RHS and other Russian units all seem to depict Russian troops in a well-organized, well-funded, non-corrupted Russian Army, which means, in effect, what we get are VDV, MORPEH, the SpN and other RSF, and some of the superior (Or "Guards") Regiments and Divisions.

It may depend more on the mission than I am aware of. If they're going to be bounding up and down over mountains they may opt to bring only the RPK(s ), but if they'll be working with their BTRs or BMPs they seem to haul the PKM.

[kala 0]

- VDV, the Vozdushno-Desantnye Voyska, are Russia's Airborne troops. They are an elite unit.

löl, yea, we saw how elite they are back to year 91.

Some officers didn't know how to read the map, BMD's broke down, some of the crews eaven drove their BMD's into the ditch to get rid of them! One local guy picked up a full loaded AKS-74 magazine after the VDV colum passed by.-This is the Pskov 76th VDV.

[sv5000 127]

@ kala, and you felt compelled to add that pearl of wisdom why?

@AKM. Thanks for the info, cleared alot up.

[kala 0]

@ kala, and you felt compelled to add that pearl of wisdom why?

Well, i am just afraid people will misundrestand and think that VDV is something very powerful or eaven unstoppable.

Good luck.

EDIT: If someone thinks i want to offend someone, then it wasnt in my mind to do that.

[sv5000 127]

fair enough

[AKM 0]

In '91, there were practically no good Russian units. Today, there are very few (compared to the bulk of the Russian military) units that are of high quality.

Any of the units I've listed are typically pretty damn good units. Kala, I didn't know that tidbit about the Pskov 76th. Good to know.

Edit:

Quote[/b] ]Well, i am just afraid people will misundrestand and think that VDV is something very powerful or eaven unstoppable.

No military force is unstoppable, but I find the Russian units tend to be underestimated far too much, far too often. Sometimes they're deserving of it. Often, not. Even the conscript units in Afghanistan, considered to be very low quality by practically everyone, were found to have high levels of technical competence and a decent measure of manuever skill and the like.

[Elite SEAL 0]

AKM,

What is the typical loadout for OMSN/SOBR units?

And do they exclusively use Russian-made weaponry?

Which in turn begs the question are they trained in the usage of Western weaponry? (for example, the Heckler & Koch MP5 series.)

[bucket man 2]

I think some special forces like the GRU Spetsnaz and Vityaz get some training with western weaponry but thats about it.

No russian army or MVD units use western weaponry as standard issue but there might be rare cases when some western "special" weapons like sniper rifles are used.

Somebody with more knowledge should correct me if I got something wrong.

[Gedis 0]

- Naval Infantry are the Marines of the Russian Federation (And former Soviet Union). They are probably the best regular troops available to the Russians, highly trained, motivated, and well equipped, needless to say, an elite on par with the VDV. They're typically used as "shock troops," used to bash their way ashore and fight through enemy defensive lines. They wear the black beret, but their distinguishing feature is a Red Circle with a Gold Anchor inside it. Naval Infantry (Morskaya Pexhota / MORPEH) are also parachute qualified and are often seen deploying in an air-assault role as well, though to my knowledge they do not form a part of the DShG.

Roman Stepanov has this to say about the Naval Infantry:

"Our Naval Infantry is one of the most respected crowds in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. I would have to say even in Soviet times. Morskaya Pexhota were always respected a lot. "Black Death" is what the Chechens called our Black Berets during Dudaev's regime. When the Caspian Regiment was taking his palace in 1995, most of the Chechens chose death instead of fighting our legendary Naval Infantry. There is evidence, some of which is recorded on video, showing Chechens jumping off the buildings. They chose death instead of face to face combat with the Black Berets. The anchor emblem is the most important thing in their lives. Black Beret and the Anchor!"

- Spetsnaz come in a variety of flavours. The original (and "only") Spetsnaz unit are those formed by the GRU, used much as the SAS would be. They conduct assassinations, raids deep behind enemy lines, sabotage, reconnaissance, and similar tasks. These are the GRU SpN. Naval SpN operate in a similiar fashion. During Soviet times, most SpN could be identified (those operating alongside Airborne units) by the lack of a "Guards" patch, which was worn by nearly all VDV Regiments as they had earned the honourific during the Great Patriotic War (WWII). However, Naval Spetsnaz wore the uniform and insignia of the Naval Infantry and thusly could not be identified in such an easy manner. The Naval Spetsnaz have retained their secrecy, and little is known of them.

From personal discussions with a GRU SpN man who would prefer not to be named at the moment, the Naval Spetsnaz are "frightening motherfuckers, very skilled."

It should be noted that Spetsnaz is an abbreviated term which means "Special Purpose." Spetsnaz, and the abbreviation SpN, are often used to denote units which are not used in the above described roles, and has become a sort of "one size fits all" term for any Russian Special Forces unit. The Spetsnaz units released by RHS at the time of writing (GRU & Naval) operate with the Military, not the MVD.

yeah, same things my father told to me long ago...

his friend, served in that Black berrets spetsnaz(you know, like navy seals... diving, capturing ships...).

i still wounder how they can capture moving ship without a detection...

Well most of things were known, only that MVD confused me... thank you AKM for good post i found it usefull

[JdB 151]

Edit:

Quote[/b] ]Well, i am just afraid people will misundrestand and think that VDV is something very powerful or eaven unstoppable.

No military force is unstoppable, but I find the Russian units tend to be underestimated far too much, far too often. Sometimes they're deserving of it. Often, not. Even the conscript units in Afghanistan, considered to be very low quality by practically everyone, were found to have high levels of technical competence and a decent measure of manuever skill and the like.

I think that more dates back to the Cold War days, when the US and NATO constantly overestimated the USSR's strength in both conventional and non-conventional arms.

I had this text account of a Russian VDV unit that was just about annihilated after a battle with , but seem to have lost it...

After some searching I found it (all hail sensible filenames):

Quote[/b] ]ULUS-KERT: An Airborne Company's Last Stand

Sergeant Michael D. Wilmoth, US Army Reserve, and

Lieutenant Colonel Peter G. Tsouras, US Army Reserve, Retired

In four days of desperate fighting, from 29 February to 3 March 2000, a large force of Chechen fighters wiped out a Russian paratroop company in the harsh defiles and ridges of the Argun Gorge in the mountains of southern Chechnya. Although the battle was a catastrophic tactical defeat for the Russian airborne force, the company's stubborn defense to the last man and the concentration of Russian relief forces inflicted a strategic setback on the Chechens. The Russians stumbled into this catastrophe through poor unit leadership, but Russian blood and valor transformed it into victory.

Hatred to the Bone

In Fall 1999, the Second Chechen War began. The Russian Army sought to reimpose the Russian Federation's authority in lawless, breakaway Chechnya. The Russians and Chechens' shared 200-year history had been punctuated by convulsions of blood and cruelty. The First Chechen War, from 1994 to 1996, had ended in the Russian Army's humiliation and left Russia with its highest loss of resources and professionalism since the Soviet Union's demise. The loss of basic combat skills also had been horrific. This second round was the Russian Army's opportunity to show that it had recovered something of its former ability.

Nothing expressed the depth of Russian-Chechen animosity more than the battle cries hurled back and forth across the firing lines during the siege of Groznyy. To the Chechen shouts of "Allah Akhbar!" the Russians would respond, "Christ is Risen!"

After Groznyy fell, Chechen forces regrouped in the rough, mountainous areas of southern Chechnya. By late February, a large Chechen force of from 1,600 and 2,500 fighters had concentrated in the town of Ulus-Kert, where the Abazolgul and Sharo-argun rivers join.1 The area was one in which the Russians had not dared enter during the First Chechen War. This time, they did not hesitate to follow.

A Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) tactical group attacked Chechen forces at Ulus-Kert, forcing them southeast. One of the VDV tactical group's regimental task forces, based on the 104th Guards Parachute Regiment (GPR) of the 76th Guards Airborne Division (GAD), was to block the gorge while the VDV tactical group encircled the Chechens.

Area of Operations

The small town of Ulus-Kert is surrounded by extremely steep, mountainous terrain. Approximately 6 kilometers south of the town and extending far to the southeast are the Dargenduk Mountains. A road leading generally south out of Ulus-Kert and up the northeastern edge of the Dargenduks crosses over a 1,410-meter hill, referred to as Hill 1410. Approximately 1.5 kilometers directly southeast of Ulus-Kert is Hill 705.6. Just about one-half kilometer south of Hill 705.6 is a narrow opening to a small gorge. Three and one-half kil-ometers southeast of Ulus-Kert, on the gorge's easternmost side, is Hill 776. Hill 787 is only 1 kilometer farther south.

A road leading southeast from Ulus-Kert over Hill 705.6 turns south into the gorge. Another road intersects the first then leads to the western edge of the saddle between hills 776 and 787 where it divides into mountain paths crossing the saddle. Hill 787 is approximately 4.3 kilometers north of Hill 1410. At the time of the operation, the weather was foggy and cold, with snow on the ground.

The Chechens planned to escape advancing Russian forces by using the advantage of the mountainous terrain southeast of Ulus-Kert. After slipping through the passes, the fighters could seize the strategic population centers of Makhkety, Elistanzhi, Zaduli, Kirov-Yurt and Vedeno, which provided a west-to-east corridor in relatively low, flat terrain through which remaining Chechen forces could withdraw to Dagestan.2 From Dagestan, they could renew the struggle on more favorable terms.

The VDV tactical group's mission was to counter the Chechen force's objectives by blocking its escape through the mountains then encircling it so artillery and combat air support could be used. Engaging infantry soldiers in direct combat was to be kept to a minimum. The plan to encircle Chechen forces—a common Russian tactic—reflects the Russians' desire to minimize casualties.

The First Chechen War had not been popular with the Russian populace because of the high death rate. Tension was also rife in the Russian command arrangement. Airborne forces felt they were being used as cannon fodder to reduce casualties among motorized infantry troops. Underlying this tension was the old rivalry between Russian airborne forces and ground forces. Historically, the VDV had been a separate service. Briefly in the late 1990s, it had been subordinated to ground forces. Newly appointed commander of Russian airborne forces Colonel General Georgiy Shpak had obtained a reversal of this decision and zealously guarded the VDV's independence.

Shpak streamlined the organization and obtained new missions for it, primarily in peacekeeping operations. By the time operations around Ulus-Kert were under way, the grouping of airborne forces had been subordinated to Colonel General Gennadiy N. Troshev, Commander of the Eastern Grouping of Federal Forces, who reported directly to General of the Army Viktor Kazantsev, who commanded the Operations Group, Joint Grouping of Federal Forces, in the North Caucasus. The arrangement was not a happy one; airborne forces felt they were not being properly supported.3

The Battle Begins

The VDV tactical group was a task force based on divisional parachute regiments augmented with VDV command-level assets, such as reconnaissance subunits. The 104th GPR task force was assigned the mission of blocking Chechen escape routes east through the mountains. 104th GPR, like most Soviet/Russian parachute regiments, had three airborne battalions, an artillery battalion equipped with two S9, 120-millimeter, self-propelled guns and various support assets. Each airborne battalion had three airborne companies numbered sequentially one through nine, with the first, second and third companies composing the 1st Airborne Battalion and so on. Each 104th GPR company was augmented with reconnaissance and/or SPETSNAZ subunits from the VDV command to form company tactical groups.4

Hills 705.6, 776, 787 and 1410 were the main features of the net 104th GPR used to encircle the Chechen force. The VDV tactical group's main body crossed the Sharoargun and Abazolgul rivers, pushing the Chechen force out of Ulus-Kert toward the southeast. 104th GPR's 1st Company, 1st Airborne Battalion, still had not crossed either the Abazolgul or the Sharoargun. An unidentified 104th GPR company was on or near Hill 705.6. 4th Company and an unidentified 104th GPR airborne company, two VDV SPETS-NAZ groups and an elite Federal Security Service (FSB)—successor to the KGB—SPETSNAZ group, known as Vympel, were on Hill 1410. Present at 2d Airborne Battalion Headquarters on Hill 776 were Commander, 2d Airborne Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Mark Niko-layevich Yevtyukhin, and Captain Viktor Romanov, the commander of an artillery battery of the regimental artillery battalion who was heading a forward observer team. 6th Company, commanded by Major Sergey Molodov, was en route to the saddle between Hills 776 and 787. 104th GPR was engaged in positioning companies to block escape routes over the mountains.

The Chechen force, retreating to the southeast of Ulus-Kert along a road leading over Hill 705.6 away from the main advancing body of the VDV tactical group, was looking for the first unguarded or weakly held way over the mountains. The 1,600 to 2,500 fighters wore winter camouflage and were well equipped with various small arms, grenade launchers and mortars. They were supported by a logistics train of hundreds of pack animals.

Day 1, 29 February 2000

Early on 29 February, a 104th GPR airborne company encountered a significant Chechen force on the road leading southeast out of Ulus-Kert. Russian paratroopers engaged the Chechen fighters for control of Hill 705.6. The Russian company, significantly stressed during the fight, gained control of the hill and pushed the Chechen force southeast into the small gorge below. The company was most likely heavily supported by artillery and helicopters, as was the usual Russian operation in this war.

The 104th GPR commander ordered 2d Airborne Battalion elements to block the saddle between hills 776 and 787, which was the next possible path over the mountains for the Chechens. The 2d Airborne Battalion headquarters was already in place on Hill 776. The 2d Airborne Battalion element was to be in place by 1400. In the early morning, 6th Company, including the third platoon, 4th Company, and two reconnaissance groups, probably from the regimental reconnaissance platoon, started on foot toward the saddle.5

6th Company, with the other elements, minus the company's third platoon, arrived by late morning, ahead of schedule. The company commander established a linear defense in the saddle between the hills, fronted by a minefield facing west toward the gorge. The defense focused on the Chechen forces' expected direction of escape. No access routes through the minefield were prepared nor were platoon positions sited to be mutually supportive.6 After establishing company positions, troops began their afternoon meal, leaving their positions and congregating in the open.7

The Chechen force clearly had a better grasp of the situation. The fighters had been listening to 104th GPR communications and used this advantage and good ground reconnaissance to locate 104th GPR subunits and to set ambushes. At 1230, a 6th Company reconnaissance patrol encountered approximately 20 fighters just outside company defensive positions. That the Chechens could approach that close without detection shows that the Russians had conducted no deep reconnaissance of the approaches to the saddle.

The Chechens, armed with automatic weapons, grenade launchers and mortars, reacted quickly, seizing the initiative. The small force was probably followed by a combat element, which would have been consistent with Soviet-style reconnaissance doctrine that places great value on immediately seizing the initiative in any engagement by having a strong combat element close behind the advance reconnaissance ele-ment.8 Chechen reconnaissance elements also worked their way around the Russian position in the saddle and attacked from the rear where there were no defenses.9 With Chechens in the rear and no escape routes through their own minefield, 6th Company pulled back and dug in on Hill 776. Their retreat was so precipitous that they abandoned mess kits still full of food.10

Chechen fighters, laying down constant fire on 6th Company, received reinforcements as the main body arrived. The force encircled 6th Company and sent waves of fighters into the attack.11 By the end of the first day, 6th Company had suffered 31 dead—a 33 percent killed in action (KIA) rate.12 6th Company had barely survived three basic errors: failure to establish an all-around defense; failure to aggressively conduct reconnaisance of the enemy's expected approach route, especially given the Chechen reputation for tactical skill, reconnaisance and working around the flanks; and failure to heed warnings about the Chechen force's approach.13

For some reason, 6th Company did not anticipate with sufficient seriousness and energy the danger it had been assigned to forestall. It seems likely that weak command at the company level was compounded by a lack of timely supervision by the adjacent battalion headquarters.

Day 2, 1 March 2000

Early in the morning on Hill 1410, a reinforcement group of two VDV SPETSNAZ platoons, one Vympel SPETSNAZ group and two airborne companies departed on foot for the saddle. The group encountered several ambushes while traversing terrain as steep as 70 degrees. At approximately 0330, one VDV SPETSNAZ platoon broke through to Hill 787 but was forced to dig in because of stiff Chechen opposition.

The 1st Company was also sent to reinforce 6th Company. While attempting to cross the Abazolgul River northeast of Ulus-Kert, the unit encountered a Chechen ambush force of up to 60 men. Despite repeated attempts to fight through the Chechen ambush, the 1st Company was forced to dig in on the river's bank. At 0300, during a brief lull, 2d Airborne Battalion deputy commander Major Aleksandr Dostovalov, with 4th Company's third platoon, broke through to the encircled company. While relief forces were being held back by ambushes, waves of Chechen fighters continued to assault 6th Company on Hill 776.14 When Romanov's legs were blown off by a mortar round, the battalion commander took over.

While some reports question the lack of artillery and combat air support, others indicate that both where present throughout the four-day engagement. In his report to defense minister Igor Sergeyev, Shpak states that 2d Airborne Battalion "was supported by a self-propelled artillery battalion of the 104th Parachute Regiment and by army aviation."15 The presence of an artillery forward team with 6th Company, which included a battery commander, indicates that artillery support was at least adequate. While Shpak's statement and other reports make it certain that VDV artillery was employed throughout the engagement, it is unclear how effective it was at reducing Chechen numbers. Also unanswered is whether additional artillery assets were employed to support 6th Company.

Press reports also cite use of "Grads"—122-millimeter BM-21 multiple-rocket launchers that VDV units do not have.16 Accounts of other engagements in the southern mountains show that the Russians employed available artillery from a number of units in coordination with army aviation helicopters. These accounts stress that artillery continued to fire when helicopters disappeared with daylight. Only one Russian hel-icopter in the Chechen theater had night capability. This supports Shpak's statement that 6th Company received no aviation support at night. Helicopter support was further limited by foggy conditions during the fighting.17

The Chechens continued heavy attacks on Hill 776 from all directions throughout the early morning. Paratrooper officers showed an unhesitating willingness to sacrifice themselves, a trait the Germans had frequently noted in the grandfathers of the men on the hill. Dostovalov, already wounded, attacked a group of Chechens trying to carry off a wounded soldier and dispatched them with a grenade. Junior soldiers were equally valiant. After Private Aleksandr Lebedev ran out of ammunition, he threw himself and his last live grenade into a group of Chechens who had wanted him to surrender.

At approximately 0500, the Chech-ens breached 6th Company defenses. Cumulative casualties and odds of at least 10 to one were too much for the dwindling Russian force. As Chechens overran Hill 776, fighting became hand-to-hand, and Chechens began shooting wounded Russians. The already wounded battalion commander took over the radio from the wounded Romanov and called in artillery fire on his own position, shouting into the radio, "I call artillery on myself!"18 The Chechens suffered grievously from the artillery, and at 0610, communications with the battalion commander were lost.

As the second day of fighting closed, 6th Company counted another 26 paratroopers killed and many wounded. Counting the 31 men who had fallen the day before, 6th Company had suffered a KIA rate of almost two-thirds—57 out of 90 men.19 Chechen casualties also continued to mount. Repeated human-wave attacks are costly, especially when the defenders are supported by artillery and aviation.

The Chechens had been throwing themselves at Hill 776 to keep open a path for the rest of their force. This movement was interrupted by the arrival of the relief force from Hill 1410. Major Andrey Lobanov, commanding a 45th VDV Reconnaisance Regiment SPETSNAZ group, was with this force. He noted that hundreds of pack animals had already passed by. The Russians moved into the saddle and found 6th Company's abandoned positions and soon encountered a large Chechen group. The Russians retreated to Hill 787 from which they could cover the saddle.

The Russians intercepted the Chechen commander's desperate orders: "Do not engage in battle. Force your way forward."20 With the remnants of 6th Company still holding out on Hill 776 and new Russian forces on neighboring Hill 787, the Chechen escape route was dangerously constricted. The Russians sent a reconnaissance platoon into the saddle to find a better position. Instead, it found an ambush by Arab volunteers, covering an attempt by the main Chechen convoy to escape. Having suffered five wounded, the Russians committed another company, hoping to stop the Chechen escape attempt.21

Day 3, 2 March 2000

Late in the morning, the 1st Company broke through Chechen forces and reached the battle area. However, it could not relieve 6th Company, which was still under close attack. One officer and 32 men were still alive. Deputy company commander Captain Roman Sokolov had arrived in Chechnya barely 13 days before. Wounded in the hand, he organized the survivors' final defense. He placed the six most junior soldiers in the care of Sergeant Andrey Proshev and ordered them to escape. Then, as the Chechens pressed the attack, Sokolov called artillery fire down on his position as a desperate attempt to fend off the enemy. Another 16 paratroopers on Hill 776 were killed in the continuing fighting.22

Day 4, 3 March 2000

The struggle for control of Hills 776 and 787 ended on the fourth day of the fighting. The last 11 paratroopers on Hill 776 were killed.23 The relief force found Proshev's small band of survivors.24 The surviving Chechens, who had not been able to escape over the saddle before the relief's arrival, slipped back down into the gorge pursued by paratroopers and hunted by helicopters. The Russian pursuit took them about 5 kilometers east to the village of Selmentausen where a number of escaping Chechens had concentrated.

Mopping Up

The Chechens won a Pyrrhic victory. Tarrying to bludgeon through 6th Company allowed VDV forces to fight through difficult terrain and Chechen ambushes to close off the main body's escape. Most surviving Chechens were ultimately forced back into the gorge, where troops from 104th GPR took a number of prisoners.

While no 6th Company personnel surrendered or were taken prisoner, the four-day struggle resulted in the death of at least 84 VDV soldiers, including 13 officers. Even after losing its senior officers, 6th Company held its final positions against a much larger force.

Chechen casualties included approximately 400 dead. According to Krasnaya Zvezda, the official newspaper of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD), this figure was based on radio-intercept data, intelligence reports, eyewitnesses, local residents and captured Chechens.25

The Arab volunteers fighting with the Chechens appeared, in particular, to have suffered severely. Heavy Arab casualties would not be unusual among particularly fanatical units, nor would it be unusual for the Chechens to have pushed the Arabs first into harm's way. Lobanov counted 200 enemy dead on Hill 776 alone, along with 75 Russian paratroopers. Survivor Viktor Sokirko stated, "I took a notebook from the pocket of one of the gunmen with a roster of 100 people; the bullet had hit him right in his heart; it had gone through his Koran."26

The bodies of the 84 fallen VDV troops were evacuated on foot, with combat aviation providing support. It was shaping up to be a bloody month for the Russian Army; it had a total of 156 dead—a higher KIA rate than during the grimmest comparable period in the storming of Groznyy.27

6th Company accomplished its mission. The Chechen force was blocked from escaping the encirclement. More important, Chechen commanders realized that they could not seize strategic population centers in the low terrain and would be forced to stay in the mountains. In the next few days, a number of Chechen fighters surrendered to the Russians. The day after the battle ended, a Chechen field commander surrendered with 73 men, including 30 wounded—the largest surrender to that date. Made up largely of Chechen teenagers, this band had actually escaped over the saddle before the relief arrived on 2 March. It surrendered on the outskirts of Selmentausen. The young men had had enough of war.28

Recriminations

The loss of 6th Company provoked an interservice exchange of recriminations. At a news conference, Shpak bluntly blamed the disaster on the Eastern Grouping of Forces' commander, to whom the airborne troops had been subordinated. Shpak's subordinates added their fire: "It all began back in Dagestan, when Kazantsev sent the airborne troops to their death and protected his own infantry."29 They claimed airborne forces had been stretched too thin and "in isolation from the main forces. . . . [T]he grouping command treats the airborne troops as cannon fodder."30

By the middle of March, cumulative airborne casualties gave ammunition for their charges. Shpak reported that 181 airborne soldiers had been killed and 395 wounded in Chechnya out of a force of about 5,100 men. The total Russian force in Chechnya had averaged about 100,000 and had lost 1,291 Defense Ministry troops and 617 Interior Ministry troops for a total of 1,908, suffering 3,190 and 2,107 wounded. Airborne forces had numbered five percent of the force and suffered 10 percent of the deaths.31

Shpak had a point. While the operational concept of blocking and trapping the Chechens was sound, the net was too weak. 104th GPR was forced to commit individual companies, which could not be easily reinforced, to oppose the breakthrough attempt of a lethal brigade-size unit. The airborne net should have been backed up with larger motorized rifle formations. Shpak's complaints carried enough weight to have the Grouping of Airborne Forces transferred from Troshev's command to the Joint Grouping of Federal Forces—the overall headquarters for operations in Chechnya.

Reconnaissance and Security

Kazantsev, former commander of the Grouping of Airborne Troops in Chechnya, accurately described the situation: "Such heavy losses could have been avoided. Reconnaissance must be carried out more carefully."32 After walking over the battlefield, Lobanov, who fought forward with the relief, also said pointedly, "There is a continual question in my head: Why was there no information that such a horde of gunmen was breaking through?"33 Compounding this failure was the lackadaisical attitude toward the company's security. 6th Company had blinded itself, allowing Chechens the priceless element of surprise. Had 6th Company been properly alerted and ready in proper defenses, it might have been able to hold off the Chechens successfully until relief arrived. One elemental failure cascaded into another, which might explain why the battalion commander suddenly emerged as the defense's motivating force once the disaster unfolded.

However much the Russian official line emphasizes the heroism of 6th Company paratroopers, the results of the official inquiry ordered by President Vladmir Putin was professionally blunt. The force was accused of "slovenliness, laxity and unprofessionalism."34 The force showed a glaring loss of basic tactical skills at the company level during the encounters. Such basic tactical considerations should have been uppermost in the company officers' minds. Whether this was a local aberration or indicates pervasive problems throughout Russian Army elite forces, the VDV's failure poses important questions about Russian capabilities. While the VDV performed credibly and often with distinction in the Second Chechen War, there have been enough blatant exceptions to conclude that even the VDV's skills are no longer of a uniform high standard, despite Shpak's reforms.

Pride of Corps

On the positive side, 6th Company recovered and fought well against enormous odds once it moved to Hill 776 under the effective leadership of the battalion commander and his deputy. Other Russian airborne and SPETSNAZ forces in the area, responding to reinforce 6th Company, fought their way into the area and eventually stopped the Chechen breakout. All this occurred in enormously difficult terrain and weather conditions and against tenacious Chechen resistance. Because the Chechens are notoriously atrocity-prone, especially toward members of the more elite Russian military organizations, fighting to the death makes a necessity.

Media reports consistently indicate that no 6th Company soldiers were taken prisoner. They refused to give up their position, even while knowing they would be overrun and killed. The VDV is known as an elite force composed of soldiers with high morale, discipline and a sense of purpose. Their actions make it clear that this characterization held true. Despite glaring tactical mistakes in security and reconnaissance, the Russian airborne spirit successfully imbued its men with the morale and courage that come with pride of corps.

Despite the bad publicity surrounding the casualty figures in this battle, the Russian Army achieved an important victory. By holding Hill 776 long enough for additional VDV troops to fill the area, 6th Company defeated the Chechen strategy to break out of the mountains and regain the initiative. Chechen fighters, seeing they could not break through Russian lines, were forced to scale back their objectives. Instead of employing relatively large groups against vulnerable population centers, Chechen leaders realized they had to break up into smaller formations to wage war at a much lower level.

But, this was an expensive Russian victory. Russian blood and valor had to make up for the deficit in basic combat skills, an issue larger than one small-unit leadership failure. The entire Russian force has suffered too many similar catastrophies for the fate of 6th Company to be just a tragic exception. Still, there was significant improvement in battlefield performance between the First and Second Chechen Wars, although performance levels still remained low, which reflected how bad things had become. The failure of an elite force such as the Russian airborne shows how fragile and perishable such skills are.

The Aftermath

The battle of Ulus-Kert was quickly enshrined in heroic myth, its theme loudly echoed by Russian media, the Ministry of Defense and the airborne forces themselves. This reflects popular support for the war and the military and a renewal of Russian nationalism. It also served to distract public attention from manifest failures the catstrophe revealed. Certainly the results of the official inquiry commissioned by Putin will never be made public. Nonetheless, he issued a decree decorating all of the fallen paratroopers, with all 13 officers and nine enlisted men receiving Russia's highest medal—Hero of the Russian Federation.35

A memorial service was held on 14 March at the Novopasskiy Monastery in Moscow. The service was conducted by Russian Orthodox Patriarch Alekisy II of Moscow and all Russia, and was attended by Putin, Chief of the Russian General Staff General Anatoliy Kvashnin and national and military leaders. It was an enormous statement of resolve. Likewise, the funeral of most of the Russian dead at their home garrison in Pskov was a heartfelt demonstration of this sentiment. Most of the dead were buried in Pskov where the funeral service was held in the ancient Trinity Cathedral.

Speaking at the funeral, Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev stated, "This battle for a nameless height was the turning point of the entire Chechen campaign. It was a do-or-die crisis for the fallen, and they chose to follow the paths of their ancestors in similar desperate straits. Just such decisions were made by Russian servicemen on Kulikovo Field, on Lake Chud, at Borodino and at Sevastopol. In the winter of 1941 Panfilov's legendary heroes defended the last line with their lives on the approaches of Moscow. Nowadays the Argun Gorge has been just such a line for the Guards' paratroopers."

[Shadow NX 1]

Wow good thread, at first thanks AKM, hope this will make it easier for people to make more realistic missions.

Also thanks JdB just printed it out and read it, wow, gives me the shivers thinking of the situation of the 6th there.

The part with the commander calling in artillery reminded me of the final scenes in platoon wghere the commander ordered a airstrike on his own position...

Well RIP to the Desantnik who gave their life for this.

[kala 0]

Those were the Desantniki from Pskov, there was a movie made about it this year, but dunno the name.