The Iraq Thread 2

[FSPilot 0]

Quote[/b] ]No, they never found them. The UN destroyed a lot of weapons but was convinced that there was more. Saddam was less than cooperative and the inspectors left before validating his claims. The thing is that nobody really knows how much he produced in the first place since he never provided any acceptable documenatation of it. It's fairly certain that he did not produce any since 1991 when he shut down his WMD programs.

As for the unaccounted stuff, it's pretty academic as those weapons would be completely useless by now.

I remember seeing a nice long list of stuff the UN knew about but left before it could destroy.  Of course now I can't find the list.

Quote[/b] ]In theory yes, but what about the infrastructure? All the chemical and biological weapons have a very limited shelf life ranging from a couple of weeks to three, max four years. Unless he was planning on using them within that time interval, the whole WMD program would be pointless. So while he could have perhaps hidden chemical munitions etc, he could have not hidden the plants that produced them. And since no evidence of such plants have been found the most obvious explanation is that there were no such plants in operation after 1991.

Why couldn't he of put a plant underground?  Since 1991 he had plenty of time.

I'm aware that the weapons in 1991 would of expired by now, but that doesn't mean that he didn't produce more of them in underground bunkers.

[Crazysheep 1]

Good article on the subject: Lies About Iraq’s Weapons Are Past Expiration Date

That article made me real angry, for some reason...because it's so obvious we were lied to. Like, REALLY angry. I should get help or something....

[denoir 0]

Why couldn't he of put a plant underground?  Since 1991 he had plenty of time.

I'm aware that the weapons in 1991 would of expired by now, but that doesn't mean that he didn't produce more of them in underground bunkers.

Because these plants are no small things. There is no way something that big could have been hidden. First of all, it would show up on satellite direcetly, second the people who constructed it and who worked there would have come forward by now.

Here's a satellite image of the Fallujah III Chemical Plant, a facility used to manufacture chemical weapons prior to 1991 when it was shut down and transformed under UN supervision:

Now imagine trying to construct something like this underground without everybody knowing about it.

Edit: Collection of Desert Storm images that among other things how Iraqi chemical plants look like. Should give you a good idea why it is unreasonable to think that such infrastructure could be covertly built under ground.

[FSPilot 0]

There are a lot of ways they could of built something like that underground. The vietcong had miles of underground tunnels which we never saw coming. They could of had it scattered in bits and pieces all over the country. A certain building here, a lab there, which also could of been underground.

And I wouldn't be surprised if nobody came forward about it, especially considering that the one who turned in the Hussein brothers is now an outcast for betraying an Iraqi.

[Badgerboy 0]

Talk about absolute denial!

[Warin 0]

There are a lot of ways they could of built something like that underground.  The vietcong had miles of underground tunnels which we never saw coming.  They could of had it scattered in bits and pieces all over the country.  A certain building here, a lab there, which also could of been underground.

And I wouldn't be surprised if nobody came forward about it, especially considering that the one who turned in the Hussein brothers is now an outcast for betraying an Iraqi.

The VC tunnels didnt have manufacturing facilities for chemical and biological weapons.

I think you just simply do not understand the scope of the facilities required to manufacture chemical and biological weapons.

[FSPilot 0]

Well, I dont understand the process behind it. I don't understand why they couldn't of made an underground bunker, kept the workers uninformed. Or why they couldn't of scattered their facilities around the country, what looks like an innocent tylenol factory could be something more sinister.

I guess we'll just have to wait and see.

[Warin 0]

I cant believe I am doing this *bangs head against brick wall for relief*

The size, materials, and equipment required for building and maintaining an underground chemical weapons facility are of a scope that it is not possible to just build something of that scope without it being obvious what is going on.

And the last chemical weapons facility that slick Willy bombed was actually an aspirin factory... as republicans like to point out.

[Harnu 0]

<snip>

http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iraq/images/fallujah1-dg4_s.jpg[/img

<snip>

You don't have an approximate size on those buildings do you?

[Tex -USMC- 0]

That parking lot looks like it has 3 car-type objects in it. Depending on how large those are, (and that could be anything from car-size to cargo containers for a semi-truck), that could be a couple acres or a few miles squared.

[FSPilot 0]

Where did you get that that was a parking lot?

Judging by the size of the roads I'd say those buildings are maybe 60 feet wide?

[Tex -USMC- 0]

Where did you get that that was a parking lot?

Judging by the size of the roads I'd say those buildings are maybe 60 feet wide?

look at it, genius. You ever seen 3 white rectangular things arranged assymetrically on a strip of blacktop and thing "Hmm, look at that soccer field..." ?? But anyway, your guess is good as mine, except that 60 foot number is a load of bull.

[FSPilot 0]

Well, genious, it's not a parking lot. Judging by the color of the asphalt on the road, and the mysteriously sand-like color of the "parking lot". I'd say its 3 containers on sand.

However, considering that the average 2-lane road is, by estimation, 20 feet wide. and that the roads are approximately 1/3rd the size of the green rectangular buildings, i estimate that the buildings are 60 feet wide. probably more, on second thought.

to be fair we dont know the scale of the picture, these thigns could be the small greenhouses for all we know.

[Tex -USMC- 0]

You've never seen an unpaved parking lot? You are from Kansas, right? Why would a 3rd world country waste perfectly good asphalt on a parking lot when there are so many other things that actually need to be paved? And besides, if those were cargo containers, the buildings would have to be a lot larger than 60 feet across. I mean, considering there aren't too many cargo containers that average less than 10 feet long (these are your numbers, remember?)

Edit: and sarcasm is more effective when you spell the backhanded insult correctly.

[FSPilot 0]

You think they park their cars in the sand? They'd get bogged down all the time. And those cargo containers could be anything. It's too hard to tell with this resolution. But they're sure as hell not cars in a parking lot.

[Tex -USMC- 0]

You think they park their cars in the sand?  They'd get bogged down all the time.  And those cargo containers could be anything.  It's too hard to tell with this resolution.  But they're sure as hell not cars in a parking lot.

Dirt man, dirt. I live in an environment that is fairly similar to Iraq as far as soil goes- we just have more ferrous materials in our dirt than they do. And the stuff packs beautifully- caleche ground into dust and then packed is the best for the job, but in a pinch any part of the entire dang country will suit you fine lol. I mean, you've seen the pictures of the tanks rolling through southern Iraq: their track furrows are hardly six inches deep. Multi-ton tanks, and their tracks dig less than a foot into the dirt!

[Tex -USMC- 0]

Double post

[FSPilot 0]

we'd probably have to take into account when the picture was taken and where it was taken. if it was up north in the winter that ground would be solid

[denoir 0]

Here's a high resolution picture of the plant.

It's 1300x300 m (top white rectangle) =  390,000 m^2

This is not something you would be able to bury in the desert withouth the whole world knowing it.

[Longinius 1]

I'd also like to point out that there is an enormous difference between people in the 60's digging tunnels in the jungle, and contstruction workers in our present day trying to build an enormous under ground bunker in the desert. Satellites would pick that construction up in no time, or the hard ware running to and from the site any way.

Or are you telling me that the coalition, with all their intelligence sources and satellites, wouldnt pick up on a constuction project that size, in a country they basically have under siege?

[denoir 0]

As I'm sure you know there's been additional coalition casualties today. Also the only functioning oil pipeline out if Iraq has been sabotaged and they estimate that it will take up to a month to get the oil flowing again. In addition, water distribution in Baghdad has failed again and it will take some time to get it running.

In that context, here's an interesting article:

Quote[/b] ]

Who is behind the violence in Iraq?

Iraqi sociologist Faleh A Jabar examines which groups might be responsible for the continuing violence against coalition troops in Iraq.  

Four months into the post-Saddam era, anti-coalition violence seems, on the surface, vibrant and possibly on the upsurge. The violence appears to stem from a multitude of sources and causes in which politics, ideology, culture, poverty and blunders by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) are to blame.

While most Iraqis do not support the politics of violence, they do not effectively oppose it either - one of the many paradoxes in the Iraqi puzzle. There has been a steady stream of attacks since the occupation began - targeting utilities and oil facilities, but mostly US troops.

US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld dismissed these as isolated and fragmented acts, but in mid-July the new Centcom commander, John Abizaid, said coalition forces were facing what looks like a systematic guerrilla war.

Main areas of attack

The violence appears to be well-organised and continuous. It benefits from a general atmosphere of discontent, wounded national sensibilities, penalised marginal groups, Arab and Iranian media agitation, good funding, and the CPA's self-imposed isolation from the public and the cultural blunders it has made in dealing with local communities.

Although political and ideological violence is still detached from mainstream institutional engagement or peaceful street politics, it may well gain strength if and when hardships continue.

The war to win peace, to win the hearts and minds of Iraqis, and, above all, to help them return to normality and regain ownership of their own country, has become a decisive issue.

Sensational Arab and world coverage of the violence in Iraq depicts it as an overwhelming national resistance movement. But a closer look reveals it is confined to two enclaves: the rectangle of Fallujah-Balad-Dloiya-Yusufiya in Anbar province west and north-west of Baghdad; and the area around Baquba in Diyala province, east of Baghdad.

Anbar province stands to lose much in the post-Saddam era. It had two presidents, several prime ministers and a large number of cabinet ministers, hundreds of military commanders, and thousands of wealthy businessmen.

The province contains an explosive mix of Arabism, radical Islam (Salafi Wahhabism), and very rigid tribalism, all overshadowed by fear of uncertainties and a deep sense of loss. It flourished under the Baathists and now feels marginalised. There is, however, also a silent majority in Anbar province who oppose violence and wish to carry on business as usual.

Tribes

Unlike Anbar, Diyala province is of mixed ethnic nature. In addition to Arabs, Kurds and Turkoman populate the eastern areas of this poor, peasant province. The lower, Arabic part, however, is almost a replica of Anbar in cultural terms. There is a strong Sunni fervour and a strong tribal spirit, combined in one through Sufi orders. Tribes have been patronised by the deposed president in cash and kind. The Iraqi Islamic party has also been active on the streets in several towns of Diyala province, notably the centre, Baquba. As is the case in Anbar, a strong anti-American atmosphere overshadows parts of the region.

Rumours suggest Saddam Hussein at times took refuge among tribesmen in rural parts of the province. The number of attacks there has surged since the elimination of his two sons on 22 July.

One or two pockets of resistance may also exist in the northern city of Mosul, while the south seems quiet apart from some incidents in al-Majar al-Kabeer village in Omara province in early July. Kurdistan, by contrast, has become a holiday resort for coalition troops: peaceful, friendly and with moderate temperatures.

Loyalists

So who is behind the violence? One broad, but vague, answer is Saddam Hussein's loyalists. But who are they, and are they alone?

The old intelligence-security organisations, with an estimated 30-50,000 people, melted away in early April and went underground. They enjoy a wealth of expertise in underground operations, motivation and human resources, not to mention billions of dollars.

The decision by the US administrator in Iraq, Paul Bremer, to disband the army and the interior ministry horrified and alienated members of these departments and drove many of them into clandestine regrouping.

Looting and fire destroyed precious archives that could have helped vet intelligence and security officers. Government offices were methodically set ablaze by loyalists themselves to hide their trails.

According to a secret letter signed by the general director of the Intelligence Bureau (Mukhabarat al-Amma) shortly before the fall of Baghdad, officers were instructed to destroy documents, offices and any incriminating evidence. They were also directed "to join the Islamic parties" on both sides of the communal divide.

A second group actively involved in masterminding attacks is believed to be the Salafis, or Wahhabis. This is a radical Islamic group with strong anti-US ideological antipathy. Their concept of Jihad, holy war, is unique.

Their view is that any kafir, or non-Muslim, who trespasses on Islamic land by force is an illegitimate invader who should be fought. Fighting the invader, they argue, is a universal imperative on every adult Muslim in good physical and mental health. Iraqi Salafis have good contacts with their ideological comrades in Saudi Arabia and in the Kurdish mountains.

A third and possibly overlapping group are the Arab volunteers - mostly Islamic fundamentalists of Jordanian, Palestinian, Syrian, and possibly Yemeni origins. Baghdadi families said that hundreds of these Arab volunteers (of whom there are about 6,000-7,000 in total) have been trapped in Iraq.  They have wanted to leave the country but have been unable to cross border checkpoints. They have run out of cash and are being housed by families who provide for them out of compassion for their misery rather than sympathy with their cause. These warriors of misfortune are looking for a safe exit.

A fourth type is a non-ideological, tribal avenger motivated by retaliation. In coalition raids and skirmishes, non-combatant civilian families and clans, who seek retaliation, have sustained loss of life. Indeed many civilians have been shot dead in the towns of Fallujah, Mosul, Baquba in Diyala province and al-Majar al-Kabeer village in Omara province.

Another source for such reprisal is the clans and extended families of Iraqi soldiers who fell in combat. According to a military commander with a tribal status, about 6,000 servicemen lost their lives during hostilities. About 10-20% of them may have had strong tribal affiliations.

Some tribes approached the coalition authorities demanding blood money for their sons but were told that no compensation would be paid for Iraqi soldiers killed in action. Revenge, in this and other cases, could be easily contained.

Soldiers of fortune could well constitute a fifth group taking violent action against coalition forces.

Given that society has been militarised for such a long time and impoverished for a decade or so, significant numbers of young people have been more inclined to make their living by the gun.  Thus, violence in post-war Iraq has different, and sometime conflicting sources. It is of political, ideological, cultural or economic origin.

[Cloney 0]

That's quite an interesting read Denoir, good post.

[FSPilot 0]

Is it at all possible that the old Iraqi gov't was behind the looting?

Longingus

Quote[/b] ]Or are you telling me that the coalition, with all their intelligence sources and satellites, wouldnt pick up on a constuction project that size, in a country they basically have under siege?

They didn't have it under siege for 30 years. Saddam could of built these things at any time.

[denoir 0]

They didn't have it under siege for 30 years.  Saddam could of built these things at any time.

But then we come back to the issue of shelf life which is limited for both chemical and biological weapons. If it was  produced over 3-4 years ago then it's worthless. As for the infrastructure, it would have been impossible to hide due to the excessive thermal output of chemical plants. Furthermore these things require a lot of electricity and water. It would be extremely difficult to hide that.

Facts:

[*] Chemical and nuclear weapons require extenisve infrastructure. (1)

[*] That infrastructure is too big to hide. (2)

[*] The shelf lives of anthrax, VX gas, serin etc are max a couple of years. (3)

The claims of TBA was that Saddam had WMD, an active WMD program and that he was a clear and present danger to the region an the world.

If this was true then according to (1) and (2) such infrastructure should have been found. And (3) eliminates the argument of Saddam stockpiling weapons constructed through his previous WMD programs.

So, FS, what's your next claim? That he hid them on the moon?

[Tamme 0]

So, FS, what's your next claim? That he hid them on the moon?  

Heeeyyyy... That makes sense