European Politics Thread.

[Ex-RoNiN 0]

Let's just hope their economy shapes up until then

Btw Denoir, I don't know if you're aware of it or not, but Turkish aircraft continue to perform aggressive maneuvers into Greek airspace almost daily, ignoring the jurisdiction of Athens Air Traffic Control, harrassing passenger jets and sometimes engaging in dogfights with our planes.

Am I right in thinking that Brussels can/will ask them to stop this before negotiations proceed?

[Apollo 0]

Quote[/b] ]Am I right in thinking that Brussels can/will ask them to stop this before negotiations proceed?

Knowing Brussels turkey won't be able to get into the EU if all of such type's of thing's stop.

And knowing brussels it will have to pass trough 50 govermental organizations and a multiple amount of people in each of those before it get's done.

[denoir 0]

Am I right in thinking that Brussels can/will ask them to stop this before negotiations proceed?

I hope so, but I wouldn't bet any money on it. Cyprus sets a worrying precedent where the usual criteria for the candidate has been put aside in order to speed things up.

I think it was a grave mistake in the case of Cyprus to let them join before all territorial disputes have been ordered, and I think that doing the same thing for Turkey would also be a grave mistake. But as it has happened before, it might happen again.

[Tamme 0]

Let's just hope their economy shapes up until then

Btw Denoir, I don't know if you're aware of it or not, but Turkish aircraft continue to perform aggressive maneuvers into Greek airspace almost daily, ignoring the jurisdiction of Athens Air Traffic Control, harrassing passenger jets and sometimes engaging in dogfights with our planes.

Am I right in thinking that Brussels can/will ask them to stop this before negotiations proceed?

I don't really know anything about Turkey's politics, so I'll have to ask what the point of all that is?

Anyway Brussels should definately tell them to stop, but I tend to believe that things rarely work like they should. It's called politics and diplomacy I guess.

[theavonlady 2]

Is this where things start getting really ugly?

Quote[/b] ]Ukrainian Premier Foresees New Crisis

Fri Dec 17,12:34 AM ET

By Peter Finn, Washington Post Foreign Service

KIEV, Ukraine, Dec. 16 -- Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych said Thursday that he would not accept a victory by his opponent in the Dec. 26 rerun of Ukraine's contested presidential race and that his supporters were likely to turn out into the streets en masse to block such an outcome.

Yanukovych, who was the government-backed candidate in the contested vote of Nov. 21, said the country's political and judicial systems had buckled under the weight of what he called illegal demonstrations and were violating the constitution to orchestrate his defeat.

Yanukovych warned in an interview that he might not be able to control supporters who are already mobilizing to launch a campaign of street protests in the capital in the event of a victory by the opposition candidate, Viktor Yushchenko.

"Even if Mr. Yushchenko wins, he will never be a president of Ukraine," Yanukovych said in a 45-minute interview at his campaign headquarters in Kiev. "The people who voted for me, they will never recognize him. They are talking about it even now."

His comments suggested that his supporters intend to plunge Ukraine into a new political crisis by adopting some of the tactics employed in the "Orange Revolution," a name that arose from the color adopted by Yushchenko's street campaign to protest official election results in favor of Yanukovych following the Nov. 21 vote.

Hundreds of thousands of Yushchenko supporters turned out in the days after that vote, sometimes blockading government buildings. They protested what they and Western election monitors said was widespread poll fraud in Yanukovych strongholds in eastern Ukraine.

Yanukovych said he had consistently argued for a legal resolution to the political crisis that has gripped the country since his victory was overturned by the country's Supreme Court. He said political power was not worth "a single drop of blood." But he said his ability to restrain his voters if they felt cheated was diminishing.

"If this legal nihilism continues, I will not be able to stop people," he said. "It's impossible to agree with this great injustice, this discrimination. And if it is indeed the face of the future authorities, I will never be on their side. Today in these regions, there are civil organizations that are being established, that are making lists of volunteers, and they will be making some decisions."

The prime minister said he was not involved in making those decisions and did not know what they might involve.

"Today there is a people's movement," he said, speaking in Russian. "We're not talking about myself here -- I want you to put the emphasis correctly here -- we're talking about the violation of the rights of 15 million Ukrainian voters."

Yanukovych supporters in the candidate's home region of Donetsk in eastern Ukraine had considered calling a referendum on creating an autonomous region if Yushchenko wins, but have backed off for now. Some Yanukovych supporters in southern Ukraine have said they are signing up people to march on Kiev if he loses.

Yushchenko backers have played down the threat of a mass street uprising by the Yanukovych camp, viewing it as a bluff.

The prime minister, who went on leave from his post earlier this month, said the Supreme Court, which ordered new elections, the parliament, which created new electoral rules, and the president, who signed a package of political reforms, had all acted illegally in the weeks since the last round of voting, short-circuiting the constitution to rig the next election.

"The laws that were adopted, particularly the law on the Central Elections Commission, violated my rights," he said. "I don't have a single representative at the CEC. If the goal was honest and transparent elections, why are my representatives excluded from the list of CEC members?"

He denied recent reports that he had advocated the use of force to clear the streets of Yushchenko supporters. He did say the president, Leonid Kuchma, should have restored order, but offered no views on how that could have been achieved without risking violence.

"We have law enforcement bodies which were obliged to provide for the normal work of the parliament, of the CEC and of the government," he said, breaking into cynical laughter. "They shouldn't have allowed that illegal push on all these above-mentioned bodies."

The prime minister also complained that he no longer had the kind of news media coverage he had before earlier rounds of voting. At that time, according to Western election monitors, state-controlled television stations focused their coverage on Yanukovych and almost systematically ignored Yushchenko, except to vilify him.

"Freedom of speech in Ukraine has been largely diminished," Yanukovych said. "I'm not always shown. My quotes, my interviews are just cut. Small pieces of my speeches are taken out and shown, and the entire sense of what I was trying to say is lost. This has happened since the organizers of the Orange Revolution have united with the authorities against me."

Asked about the earlier exclusion of Yushchenko from state television, he said, "you know, it wasn't done by me or my team."

Yanukovych also said he wished that Russian President Vladimir Putin (news - web sites) had not mentioned him when Putin came to Ukraine twice before the November vote, or spoken favorably about him when interviewed on television.

"Mr. Putin did not come to visit me personally; it was not a strategy of my electoral campaign," he said, denying allegations that he had benefited from Russian financial support and the work of Russian political consultants. "From a political point of view . . . it didn't raise me up. It's rather worked against me."

[Ex-RoNiN 0]

I don't really know anything about Turkey's politics, so I'll have to ask what the point of all that is?

http://www.f-16.net/f-16_news_article652.html

http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi....4_48770

http://www.eubusiness.com/imported/2003/05/110234/

http://www.hri.org/news/greek/mpab/2002/02-05-28.mpab.html#02

http://www.americanhellenic.org/modules.php?name=News&new_topic=3

http://www.f-16.net/f-16_news_article1240.html

http://www.f-16.net/f-16_news_article1228.html

http://www.f-16.net/f-16_news_article1073.html

http://www.f-16.net/f-16_news_article697.html

http://www.f-16.net/f-16_news_article596.html

[Ex-RoNiN 0]

German news agency "Der Spiegel" reports that the commission and Erdogan have come to an agreement. Apparently, recognition of Cyprus does not have to happen today or tomorrow, but Turkey has time to prepare for this. As far as I understand, its still a condition on Turkey's entry though.

[IsthatyouJohnWayne 0]

Denoir-

Quote[/b] ]I'm far more worried about a state deciding what people should be allowed to hear or to say than about those that use that right.

Given a full and free information flow, I believe that the individuals can make up their own mind. And from an entirely practical point of view, I think it is much better that people, organizations and countries loudly speak their mind so that everybody knows what they want and what they stand for - than that they operate in the background, outside of public scrutiny.

Hmm? Surely controlling information such as illegalising foreign media interference is a relatively small violation of human rights in the widest possible perspective though in your opinion it is vital to guard against, yet people being deprived by the government of their right to vote in a meaningful way and so influence their governance (the effect of vote rigging) is ok and not even worthy of EU criticism?

Quote[/b] ]

Quote[/b] ]Ex-RoNiN- I don't think the EU can work when one EU member does not recognise the existence of another EU member.

Denoir- Of course not. There is no question about it that Turkey will have to deal with the Cyprus question to EU's satisfaction before joining.

Personally, I think it was a big, big mistake to take in Cyprus, without having solved the problems with Turkey. It was a clear violation of the Copenhagen criterias (one of which dictates that no EU candidate country may have any border disputes).

I agree that its created a messy situation but if Greece and Turkey are in agreement then Cyprus could be made to feel quite unwelcome in the EU if its starts throwing its 'weight' around so early in a way that appears unreasonable. The disputes can be resolved so long as everyone sees it is in their mutual interest to do so. If border disputes included airspace limits then it seems these criteria would excluded Greece also.

From one of the links Ex-RoNiN posted-

Quote[/b] ]15/05/2003 Military officials said that in the incident two Turkish F-16 fighter aircraft threatened two Greek F-4 planes that were involved in bombing exercises between the islands of Lesbos and Limnos in the northeastern Aegean, not far from the mouth of the strategic Dardanelles strait.

The Greek defense ministry has repeatedly criticized Turkey for its alleged aggressive stance in the Aegean, attributing it to differences between the powerful military and the civilian government.

Athens tallied 6,000 violations of its airspace by Turkish forces in 2002, or 300 percent more than the previous year, but Ankara says Greece also regularly violates its airspace.

Greece claims a 10-mile airspace limit around its long coastline but Turkey only agrees to six miles, the same as Greece's territorial waters.eubusiness

What are Greece actually doing conducting bombing runs between Lesbos and Limnos (quite obviously near a sensitive area) anyway? Youde think there were enough other parts of the mediterranean for weapons practice if they are looking to diffuse tensions.

In 15-20 years Turkey has every chance (if seized) of meeting EU requirements and i wish them luck. The logistical or infrastructural problem as i see it is overwhelmingly the east of the country. The Turkey that borders Iraq and Iran is a world away from the cosmopolitan atmospere (and prosperity) of Istanbul. If Turkey could be divided into an Occidental and Oriental segment then the western segment could potentially join relatively easily by the end of the decade at most. But the east is way behind, it could do with massive infrastructural investment and it remains to be seen how long it will be before the new laws are actually followed and enforced on a daily basis. So the east is behind the west economically and infrastructurally and is culturally less european, but really so what, lots of EU countries have more backward or economically underdeveloped regions its only a question of degrees. Culturally Id have to say eastern Turkey is more a 'european influenced' part of the middle east than strictly 'european' (and russian influenced in the north east) but then these things are nebulous and always hard to judge exactly (the almost total lack of nightclubs or bars in much of the south east of Turkey is a telling sign though).

The potential of Kurdish/Turkish violence is more troubling, but is surely less likely with a stable Turkey in or moving towards the EU. If the Turkish military restrains itself if there is a new upsurge in PKK/Kongra Gel violence then that will be a good indicator of change (and hopefully there will be no such upsurge).

Overall i think the world would be a better place with Turkey in the EU.

[Ex-RoNiN 0]

Quote[/b] ]If border disputes included airspace limits then it seems these criteria would excluded Greece also.

No, as we are adhering to international law. Turkey is not having any of it, hence the dispute is actually caused by them, not us. We are applying international law, they do not recognise this bit of law, hence it is a dispute between Turkey and the law, rather than just us. By your logic, if the Ukraine suddenly decides that 1/3 of Poland belongs to the Ukraine, then Poland would not be eligible for EU membership. Every dispute has an aggressor and a victim of aggression, and it is clearly Turkey (a non-EU member) that is the aggressor here.

Quote[/b] ]What are Greece actually doing conducting bombing runs between Lesbos and Limnos (quite obviously near a sensitive area) anyway? Youde think there were enough other parts of the mediterranean for weapons practice if they are looking to diffuse tensions.

We can do whatever the hell we want inside our borders. The important fact is that we are not doing anything outside of our borders - unlike Turkey.

Stop trying to twist the facts, Turkey is the clear aggressor. All we ever have done is insist on the status quo. Turkey always wants more and more, hence why they're pushing into our airspace, not recognising international law, etc. They are the aggressors, we are the victim of aggression, and that's a fact.

[Leveler 0]

When these talks will be concluded and when Turkey will actually join is a different matter. Current estimates seem to be in the range of 10-15 years.

10 - 15 years!? That is the european way of saying ''when hell freezes over''.

[dinger 1]

Heh. I usually stay out of here, but I've seen nothing but two weeks of whining about Turkey and the EU.

First, Cyprus does not have officially have any border disputes, except in the eyes of Turkey. Every other country in the UN agrees on what Cyprus' borders are, and that, technically, Turkey has an occupation army and a puppet state in the North.

Second, that's about all you can say on the Republic of Cyprus' favor. They've got the bare legal claim to these things and are going to insist that's enough.

Third, don't forget forty years of selective history. The story you here on this side of the Green Line is all evil Turks and conspiring foreign powers, and an unjustified and cruel invasion. While much of that did occur, it does kinda gloss over that whole "genocide thing."

So, it's kinda hard to compromise when your understanding of the past has you the helpless victim and the other guy the evil, wicked aggressor. Making it worse is the political ploys of appeals to emotions, acting reasonable to the world, then turning around and stating the extreme to the locals.

So, well, yeah, expect Cyprus to use the veto; and expect Cyprus to blow it somehow, and Turkey to be in the EU without the Cyprus issue being resolved.

In any case, Cyprus does make sense in the EU. The standard of living is higher than in most EU member states, and the economy is largely geared towards Europe.

[denoir 0]

In any case, Cyprus does make sense in the EU.  The standard of living is higher than in most EU member states, and the economy is largely geared towards Europe.

While the economy may be geared towards Europe, their standard of living is well below average.

To be precise, Cyprus is around 20% below the EU25 average when looking at the GDP/capita.

They're doing ok, in relation to the other new member states, but not so well compared to the "original" 15 EU states. At the top of the chain is Luxemburg followed by Ireland where the GPD/capita is about twice the one in Cyprus.

Of course, the plan is that over time they'll come up to the same levels - but that might take some time. Just being part of the EU is not a miracle cure. It worked extremely well in Ireland, but if you look at for instance Portugal or Greece, they're still below average, even in the EU25.

Here's a full relative table from EuroStat.

[ralphwiggum 6]

http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/europe/12/31/berlusconi.reut/index.html

Quote[/b] ]ROME, Italy (Reuters) -- Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi was slightly hurt on Friday when a tourist threw a camera tripod at him in a packed Rome square, the ANSA news agency reported.

ANSA said the tripod struck Berlusconi on the neck as he was walking through Piazza Navona. He immediately returned to his nearby offices and was seen by a doctor as a precautionary measure.

Police immediately arrested the assailant, identified by ANSA as a 28-year old bricklayer from the northern Italian city of Mantova who was in Rome for the New Year holiday.

The agency gave no reason for the attack.

Berlusconi's office was not immediately available for comment.

The prime minister regularly goes for unannounced walkabouts in central Rome and often stops for an ice cream in a Piazza Navona cafe.

[Ex-RoNiN 0]

Firstly, I apologise for the very long post to come, but this is of major importance and a potential Casus Belli with Turkey.

Quote[/b] ]

Greek Military Magazine Discusses Turkish Ballistic Missiles

Project

GMP20020320000249 Athens Stratiyiki in Greek 01 Feb 02 pp 84-93

[Report by Thanasis Ghrammatikos: "Turkey's top-secret ballistic

missiles development project"]

In its 14 January 2002 issue, the Turkish newspaper Milliyet

(the online version @ www.milliyet.com.tr/2002/...un02.html)

featured a carefully worded article revealing that the first

testing of a Turkish-made ballistic missile had been successful.

The salient [Greek] government departments and the ministries

of Foreign Affairs and Defense have been aware for some time

now of this serious matter of which unfortunately there has

been been almost no mention in the Greek media.

This raises a host of questions (especially at the present

juncture) on the quality of information Greek citizens have

access to. This publication will attempt to throw some light

on this particularly complex issue (which brings to mind a spy

thriller) which, it would seem, topples the existing balances

in the region.

According to Milliyet's article, the "J missile," as it

is described, was the first to be manufactured in Turkey using

technology imported from China. All those witnessing the test

were reportedly impressed. The first test was held in late December

[2001] at the coastal area of Sile near Istanbul; the missile

was launched toward the Black Sea area. The aforementioned missile

is being "improved" since 1998, is a guided missile and has

a range of 150km. It has been likened to China's M-7 missile,

except for certain critical (kritik, in Turkish) technologies

(editor's note: evidently this refers to the guidance system).

The missile was manufactured at Roketsan's facilities in Ankara;

from now on, Turkey's armed forces will have the capability

of striking targets well behind enemy lines.

With the "J missile," Turkish armed forces will be capable

of destroying the enemy's missile launchers, military bases,

armored combat units and command centers. Depending on progress

achieved during production, the article went on, Turkey would

be increasing [the missile's] range. According to the Turkish

author's "sources," despite the fact that Turkey's neighboring

countries possessed huge missiles of 1000km range, it was not

Turkey's intention to exceed the highest permissible range of

300km as defined by international treaties. Evidently, the article

was aimed at reassuring countries in the region and at preempting

any reaction from international organizations.

But the truth of the matter, as will be revealed below,

is quite different and paints a grim picture of the future in

the region. It should be said that the recent Turkish test was

not an isolated action, rather it was part of wider strategic

planning, the ultimate goal of which is for Turkey to acquire

ballistic missiles of a range over 1,000km by 2004-2005. This

conclusion is not arbitrary, but is based on a classified recommendation

on the strategic goals of the Turkish armed forces that was

approved a few years ago by that country's all-powerful National

Security Council.

Especially disconcerting is the fact that, in contrast to

previous similar attempts, the United States has now given its

tacit acceptance; it is thought that US secret services know

in full detail what is going on. That would explain why new

facts and figures are constantly being publicized on the development

of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction in "hostile"

countries such as North Korea, Iran, Iraq and Libya, but not

Turkey, where everything is hush-hush.

Background to Turkish attempts

Turkey's attempts at developing missile technology date

back several years. The venture began in the mid-1980s and was

in parallel with attempts at acquiring weapons of mass destruction,

which we shall analyze in our next issue. The main organization

charged with attaining these objectives is SAGE [Defense Industries

Research and Development Institute] of the Scientific and Technical

Research Council (TUBITAK), headquartered in Ankara. TUBITAK-SAGE

was founded in 1972, its objective being the development of

scientific research in the military sector for the benefit of

the armed forces and the domestic weapons industry.

In the 1970s, SAGE activities were limited due to insufficient

funds and lack of experience. The first serious attempts began

in the early 1980s with the foundation of departments and laboratories

of applied research on certain crucial areas relating to missile

technology. Today, these departments are: Department of Mechanics

and Systems, Chemicals and Propulsion Technologies, and the

Department of Electronics and Guidance & Control Technologies.

The Department of Mechanics and Systems has a Structural

Mechanics and Materials laboratory that carries out research

in linear and non-linear elastic structures, synthetic materials,

dynamics, conduction and heat transfer, etc. The External

Ballistics lab deals with aerodynamic design, behavioral analysis

of airborne objects (it has an aerodynamic chamber measuring

3.05 x 2.44 x 6.10m), etc. The Internal Ballistics and Tests

lab deals with internal ballistics issues, solid-fuel missile

engines and the design of solid-state propellants using software

developed in-house.

The Department of Chemicals and Propulsion Technologies

has a lab researching development of synthetic solid-state missile

propellants and their ballistic and mechanical attributes; the

Chemical Analysis lab carries out advanced chemical analyses

and specialized measurements on the attributes and performance

of various synthetic chemicals.

Finally, the Electronics and Guidance & Control Technologies

department has the required infrastructure for design, real-time

simulation and measurement of guidance & control systems and

of inertial guidance systems for aircraft and missiles. To this

end, it avails of a special test data bank, which also has calibration

and adjustment facilities for such systems.

To implement Turkey's ambitious goals, Roketsan A.S, was

founded in 1988; the corporation was charged with all activities

relating to the manufacture of rockets and guided missiles and

also the development (in cooperation with TUBITAK-SAGE) of missile

technology for the wider needs of the Turkish armed forces.

The corporation's initial share capital was $10.5 million. The

major shareholders were: private companies Kutlutas with a 20

percent stake, Sezai Turkes-Feyzi Akkaya with 20 percent, Kalekalip

with 15 percent, and state-owned corporations MKEK with 15 percent

and Aseisan also with 15 percent; the remaining 15 percent went

to TSKVG (Assistance to Armed Forces Council) [as published].

On 8 October 1991 Roketsan's new production facilities were

inaugurated; they comprised a total area of 27,000 square meters,

spread out across an expanse of 1,000 acres, in line with international

safety regulations. The new facilities are located in the Elmadag

area, near Ankara. Roketsan was staffed with dozens of scientists

and trained personnel totaling over 250 persons. Among these,

over 30 percent are mechanics. The premises' equipment includes

an advanced X-ray system used in non-destructive testing, structural

vibrations facilities, environmental controls and thermal shock

facilities.

Roketsan's activities include the production of missile

engines, rocket engines, launcher parts, missile assembly and

production of synthetic fuel propellants. Also active in the

area of missile technology are: the Kalekalip corporation (which

has a 15 percent stake in Roketsan), which manufactures and

assembles missile parts; and the state-owned MKEK weapons industry

with its MKEK-ELROKSAN factories based in Elmadag, the MKEK-CANSAS

factories based in Cankiri and the MKEK-MAKSAN facilities based

in Ankara.

All the above research and industrial units (together with

smaller units acting as sub-manufacturers) also participate

in the known program of development and construction of multiple

rocket launchers of different caliber (TR-107, T-122, TOROS,

etc.) and of the corresponding rockets. Turkey's first serious

attempt at acquiring missile technology came in 1988, through

an ambitious joint-production program with the United States

for the manufacture of 180 MLRS systems and 55,000 M26 combat

rockets. Turkey's outrageous (in the US view) demands concerning

transfer of technical know-how, coupled with the revelation

of Ankara's suspect plans, led the United States to terminate

the venture.

At the same time period, Turkey began its close cooperation

with Pakistan, which by then had significantly developed its

own program of HATF-1 and HATF-2 ballistic missiles (with a

range of 30 and 80km, respectively). With Pakistani aid, the

top-secret Turkish program of developing the ASR-227 missile

got under way in 1988; that program was based on the results

of Turkish research and on raw materials from Pakistan. Simultaneously,

Turkey attempted to again approach and appease the United States,

proposing the joint-production 1,000 ATACM missiles. Naturally

the United States turned down the offer, thereby giving Turkey

the excuse to seek new partners.

In 1989 Turkey first sounded out France, which diplomatically

denied offering technical know-how and comprehensive solutions.

But France agreed to sell Turkey state-of-the-art telemetry

and testing equipment, provided a Turkish international tender

would choose Thomson's TRS-22XX radar; the deal went through.

Meanwhile work got under way for the construction of a suitable

test area at the Sile coast near Istanbul. At around the same

time period the equipment from France began arriving; this was

first used in April 1990 during tests for the ASR-227 missile.

It is believed that the ASR-227 was assembled at the MKEK-ELROKSAN

facilities at Elmadag using both Turkish and Pakistani materials.

This alarmed the United States and Israel, which did not

look kindly on Turkey's partnership with Pakistan at a time

when Pakistan was intensifying its efforts to manufacture nuclear

weapons. In 1991 several Congressmen protested against Turkey's

proven involvement in Pakistan's nuclear program; this led to

strong pressure on Turkey to terminate its partnership with

Pakistan; the pressure paid off. This in turn meant Turkey again

needed to seek new partners, but these efforts were fruitless.

In 1991 an idea was put forward on continuing the project autonomously

with the assistance of thousands of scientists who were leaving

the crumbling Soviet Union in search of a better life.

In the second half of 1991 and early 1992, the Turkish secret

services recruited more than 200 Turkic-origin scientists and

experts on ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction.

Next began a new cycle of research programs at TUBITAK-SAGE

under the supervision of professors Haluk Aksel and Huseyn Vural;

this research was coupled by a necessary shift to Soviet technology.

But due to strict limitations arising from the implementation

of the MTCR (Missile Technology Control Regime) treaty, serious

problems came up with finding raw materials and also developing

the necessary computer software.

At the same time, it became known that a large quantity

of propellant fuels for ballistic missiles had been stolen;

the fuel had been stored in former Soviet republics of the Caucasus

region. In addition, gyroscopes, accelerometers and other critical

material went missing in mysterious circumstances; these components

came from the disassembling of ballistic missiles that were

withdrawn from countries of the former Soviet Union within the

framework of the implementation of the INF treaty. Investigations

by US and Russian secret services led to the Russian mafia which,

it turned out, had channeled the equipment to Turkish "businessmen"

(one of whom was the husband of former Turkish Minister Ciller)

and to Iraq.

In 1995 (?) [as published], with the help of the late general

Massoud, then commander of the Northern Alliance, a SCUD-8 missile

launcher from Afghan reserves was transferred [to Turkey?] via

Pakistan, for an unknown price. The aim was to attempt reverse

engineering and also to use the vehicle for testing purposes.

This attempt too ended in failure due to American and Russian

intervention. But the same did not hold true for a Multiple

Rocket Launcher development program going on at the same time

period; in September 1995 the prototypes of three systems in

production or at the final stage of development were put on

display for the first time at the IDEF exhibition.

Meanwhile, using the pretext that Turkey faced a threat

from the ballistic missiles of neighboring countries such as

Iraq, Iran and Syria, another attempt was made at developing

and building ballistic missiles. To this end, international

tenders were submitted to the United States, France, China and

Israel; only China and Israel responded. Secret negotiations

immediately got under way, and these resulted in the selection

of the Chinese offer, which was considered the best. The initial

reaction by the United States was lukewarm, but any reaction

fizzled out with the help of the Jewish lobby and also by Turkey's

application on 1 December 1995 for the purchase of 120 ATACMs.

On 12 May 1996, Al-Kifah Al-Arabi, a Syrian weekly publication,

revealed that Turkey was financing 80 percent of a top-secret

joint-production program with Israel aimed at developing medium-range

and intermediate-range ballistic missiles; the publication cited

sources in the Syrian secret service. According to Israeli experts,

Turkey's topography is ideal for the carrying out of precise

testing of ballistic missiles, while Israel's land surface is

not.

In October of the same year, the Turkish newspaper Hurriyet

revealed the existence of a secret agreement with China relating

to the direct purchase of a small number [of ballistic missiles]

and, at a later stage, joint production of the WS-1 multiple

rocket launcher system (range 80km). The deal, worth $160 million,

also provided for the transfer of technical know-how for the

construction of ballistic missiles. All the signs are there

that this missile is the [Chinese] M export series, where over

the past three years there have been attempts at improving accuracy

through the application of western technology in the guidance

system.

To this end, a large team of Chinese scientists visited

Turkey in November 1996; they were joined in early 1997 by a

small team of Israeli experts. At least 15 of the Chinese technicians

worked for a considerable period of time at ASELSAN, and specifically

at the department of Micro-electronics, Guidance and Electro-optics

based in Akyurt. The department specializes in laser gyroscopes

and inertial guidance systems. After securing a license from

Litton, since 1998 it has been manufacturing the LN-100G inertial

guidance system that is installed on aircraft and helicopters.

The LN-100G is highly compact, incorporating an INS/GPS

system with three laser gyroscopes and three accelerometers,

thanks to which it achieves an accuracy of up to 10m. Due to

its spine design, it allows for multiple uses. In this case,

it is thought that the cooperation between ASELSAN and the Chinese

with the Israelis is aimed at integrating into the Chinese M

series missiles a state-of-the-art guidance system based on

Litton's technology. In December 1996 an agreement was signed

by Turkey for the purchase of 72 ATACM missiles from the United

States worth $48 million. The purchase was aimed at moderating

US reaction and also at satisfying urgent needs. The first ATACMs

were delivered in September 1998, and the last batch in early

1999.

In 1996 another event transpired, which at first sight seemed

unrelated, but leaves wide room for interpretation. Specifically,

an agreement was signed with a factory in Minsk, Belarus, producing

tracked vehicles; the deal provided for the purchase by the

Turkish army of a large number (perhaps 60) of VOLAT-type carriers.

What is strange in this affair is that these vehicles have also

been manufactured in Turkey for years by Mercedes-Benz Turk

and MANKOS-AS.

Perhaps the explanation is linked to the fact that the same

factory [in Minsk] had from the Soviet era been manufacturing

all specialized Transporter-Erector-Launcher pods for tactical

ballistic missiles of the MAZ-543 series and (8 x and the

MZKT series (12 x 12) used in MRBMs and IRBMs. The highly mobile

MAZ-543 vehicle is to this day considered the best, and continues

to be used for the transport of all known Soviet-made SCUD-B/C

ballistic missiles and modifications, such as the Chinese M-11/DF-11.

It is likely that some modification of this vehicle will form

the launching pod for the missile systems being developed by

Turkey.

On 13 October 1997, during the visit to Ankara of Amnon

Lipkin Shahak, chief of the Israeli armed forces, it became

known that an initial agreement had been reached on joint production

of the Delilah missile, an air-to-surface Cruise missile with

a 500km range. At the same meeting, a decision was also reached

on developing a common system of secure satellite communications.

It is worth noting that, according to an earlier report by Flight

International magazine (1995), China was financing an Israeli

project for the development of an air-launched version of the

Cruise missile based on a Delilah drone. This closes the circle

of the multi-faceted cooperation between the three countries.

In October 1998 the crisis with Syria over the Ocalan affair

broke out. During that crisis the Turkish armed forces deployed

along the border the ATACMs they had just received (a week earlier)

from the United States and also a number of WS-1 systems they

withdrew from the coast of Asia Minor. That was the Turkish

reaction to the threat posed by the 36 SCUD-C missile launchers

deployed by Syria at different points along the Salamyyah highway;

the Syrian launchers had previously been deployed on the border

with Israel. The Israelis gave the Turks the exact location

of the Syrian missiles after tracking them down with the Ofeq

spy satellite.

The crisis was defused with Ocalan's arrest, but it was

later used as an excuse to counter any remaining US reaction.

That brings us to 28 September 1999, the day when the first

test of a missile produced entirely in Turkey was held with

success. The missile, with a weight-at-launch of 150kg and a

range of 60km, was designed by SAGE in cooperation with Chinese

experts; it was manufactured by ROKETSAN and MKEK. It is thought

that it was a test missile used to observe the aerodynamic behavior

of the trunk and the qualitative attributes of the propellant

material.

This was followed on 11 February 2000 by the first successful

test of the long-range TOROS 230-A and TOROS 260-A non-guided

rockets, of a diameter of 230mm and 260mm, respectively. The

rockets were designed by TUBITAK-SAGE and manufactured by MKEK

as part of the "TOROS" top-secret project. For the record, the

non-guided Toros 230A rocket has a 230mm diameter, is 4.1m long,

weighs 326kg, and has a range of 10 to 65km and a target-destruction

radius of 105m. The Toros 260A has a diameter of 260mm, is 4.8m

long, weighs 483kg, and has a range of 15 to 100km and a target-destruction

radius of 150m.

Last December, yet another piece was fitted to the jigsaw

puzzle: the first test launching of a ballistic missile (range

150km) produced entirely in Turkey. In our view, this development

is the most significant in recent years, because it signals

the beginning of a new era distinguished by the toppling of

the delicate balances that obtained to this day. It is further

obvious that the way has been paved for the attainment of Turkey's

strategic objectives, and it is now only a matter of time for

the next step to take place.

According to estimates, within the year there will take

place more tests aimed at certifying the missile before it goes

into mass production. In store for next year should be the first

tests at 300-km ranges. Worse is to come in 2004-2005, when,

barring the unexpected, we will most likely see the first launching

of a 1,000-km range missile, this time poised toward the Mediterranean.

This, coupled with the fact that a recent report by the French

secret service said clearly that in 2006 Turkey will join the

nuclear powers club, makes us raise our arms and pray to...Allah

[as published].

China's M series ballistic missiles

The development of a new series of short and medium-range

missiles aimed at exports began in China in 1984, and the project's

main characteristics were the use of solid-state boosters and

the transport of conventional warheads. The M series family

has four members, known in China as the M-7, M-9, M-11 and the

M-18. The M-7 version originated in a project known as Project

8610, which focused on turning the HQ-2 surface-to-air missile

into a ballistic missile. This is essentially a Chinese copy

of the Soviet SA-2 Guideline missile, a large number of which

China purchased in the late 1950s.

Not long after, the Chinese succeeded in constructing the

first copies (1961-1964), subsequently named the Qi-1 (HQ-1).

There followed an upgraded version, the HQ-2, which came into

service in 1967. In 1985, as part of Project 8610, there began

the development of a new version of the missile designed to

strike at ground targets at a maximum distance of 150km. Later

on this became known as the M-7 or, in NATO terminology, the

CSS-8 Chinese Surface-to-Surface Missile; the first systems

went operational in 1992.

The M-9 is a solid-state fuel propelled missile with a range

of 600km. In the Chinese weapons industry it goes by the code

name DF-15; NATO calls it the CSS-6. Now the M-11 is a Chinese

modification of the Russian SS-1 Scud B; it is a solid-state

fuel propelled missile, totally compatible with the Russian-made

MAZ 543 TEL (Transporter-Erector-Launchers). Only minor modifications

were necessary on the TEL: re-alignment of the support cradle

and the roof of the vehicle so that it can carry missiles of

differing lengths and diameter. So far there has been no corresponding

Russian version of the missile with a solid-state fuel propellant

system, so the Chinese version was designed to compete with

the Russian missiles for the market share. The M-11 has a range

of 300km and is known to Chinese armed forces as the DF-11 (CSS-7).

The fourth and last member of the M family series is the

M-18 missile, which first appeared on display at an air and

naval exhibition in Beijing in 1988. According to experts, this

missile is a lengthened version of the M-9 and is equipped with

a larger two-stage booster. The M-18 was also shown in Iran

in 1991, while reports in 1995 noted plans were under way for

joint development of advanced chemical-gas warheads with Syria,

Iran and possibly North Korea. In 1996 it became known that

Beijing's Institute of Telemetry was working on developing an

improved terminal guidance system for the CSS-6 based on INS/GPS

technology. Evidently, this piece of information coincides with

the time period during which Chinese cooperation with Turkey's

ASELSAN started.

CSS-8 (M-7/Project 8610)

The M-7 (CSS- is a short-range ballistic missile, transported

on a mobile launching pod. It employs solid-state propellants

and carries a single-unit warhead. This missile is a modification

of the SA-2/HQ-2 surface-to-air missile, to be exact the HQ-2B

version that is transported on a tracked vehicle that is modeled

on the Type 63 light combat vehicle). In its default version,

the HQ-2B is a two-stage missile, that is, it has a solid-state

fuel booster for the initial phase and a high-thrust sustainer

with liquid fuel propellants.

In the M-7, the sustainer is replaced by an advanced booster,

thereby forming a two-stage ballistic missile. The missile measures

10.8m long, 0.65m diameter for the first-stage trunk and 0.5m

diameter for the second-stage trunk. Weight-at-launch is 2,650kg.

The missile usually carries a high-explosive (HE) warhead weighing

190kg. Alternatively, it can be fitted with warheads carrying

sub-munitions or chemical weapons. It employs an inertial guidance

system and updated control commands. The rear section of the

sustainer has four moving fins that assist in control during

flight.

The booster is an improved version of the one carried by

the HQ-2 missile; it burns for four seconds and then detaches

from the main body of the missile, which continues on. The sustainer

works for 20 to 30 seconds, giving the M-7 (CSS- a minimum

range of 50km and a maximum range of 150km. It is estimated

that the M-7 became operational in 1992 and, according to some

sources, 90 of these missiles were exported to Iran that same

year. It is also believed that the Chinese were involved in

the North Korea's corresponding project to convert the SA-2

into a ballistic missile. It has further been confirmed that

several other countries, including Iran, Croatia and Serbia,

possess similar missiles; however, it is extremely difficult

to ascertain whether these are exported Chinese M-7s, modified

versions of the SA-2, or copies of the Chinese missile.

CSS-6 (DF-15/M-9)

The M-9 is a medium-range ballistic missile, transported

on a mobile carrier. The missile employs solid-state fuel propulsion

and carries a single-unit warhead. Its length reaches 9.1m,

the trunk's diameter is 1m and its weight-at-launch is 6,200kg.

The missile employs an inertial guidance system incorporating

a digital micro-processor, which allows for fast targeting and

removes the need for wind corrections prior to launch. The Cyclical

Error Probable (CEP) quoted for this missile is around 280m,

suggesting that it is fitted with an integrated terminal guidance

system. Reports indicate that, during separation, the warhead

employs small-sized boosters to correct position before re-entry

into the atmosphere and adjust orbit for the terminal phase.

The trunk has been designed so as to follow the warhead

after separation, thereby confusing and misleading enemy air

defenses. The warhead weighs 500kg, and in the default export

version carries a high explosive (HE) payload. However, the

missiles that are operational in China (described as DF-15s)

can carry a nuclear warhead of 10kT.

There are also reports on the existence of three other different

types of warheads: one with chemical weapons, one with Fuel

Air Explosives (FAE) and one that carries sub-munitions. The

M-9/CSS-6 has a minimum range of 50km and a maximum range of

600km. It is fitted with a single-stage solid-state propellant.

By simply reducing the weight of the warhead to 320kg, the range

can be increased to 800km. Control during launch and initial

acceleration is likely achieved either by diverting gas flow

using adjustable surfaces or through the use of small accuracy

boosters.

The missile is transported on a Tranporter-Erector-Launcher

(TEL) with 8 x 8 drive. Prior to launch, the missile is erected

to vertical position. The highly mobile TEL is poised into offensive

stance and calculates exact target coordinates with the help

of an advanced fire control system, which uses a digital processor

that also features automated auto-control functions prior to

launch, thereby cutting overall preparation time to under 30

minutes. The dimensions and weight of the TEL are almost identical

to those of the Russian-made MAZ 543, and it is believed that

the same launcher pod is used for both the CSS-6 and the CSS-7.

The first test launches for the CSS-6 were held in June

1988 and it is estimated that the missile went operational around

1990. Such missiles have been periodically been acquired by

several countries, including Libya, which in 1989 acquired 140

missiles (80 of which it transferred to Syria). Other countries

include Egypt, Iran and Pakistan. So far there has been no official

confirmation that China has directly exported M-9 missiles.

According to some sources, the M-9's design was used as the

basis for the development of Pakistan's Hatf 3 missile, which

it is thought was designed with Chinese assistance.

Latest reports indicate that the Chinese are now focusing

on equipping the DF-15 with GPS and an inertial navigation system

based on next-generation laser gyroscopes and a high-speed processor

so as to maximize guidance precision during terminal phase and

achieve CEPs as small as 30-45m. all this of course is being

done in cooperation with Turkey and Israel. Given that the missile's

speed exceeds Mach 6, it is practically impossible to intercept

it with conventional air defenses; this makes the missile an

ideal means with which to strike high-value targets well behind

enemy frontlines.

CSS-7 (DF-11/M-11)

The M-11 is a short-range ballistic missile that employs

solid-state fuel propulsion. It is transported on a mobile pod

and carries a single-unit warhead. Very little is known about

this missile, except that its solid-state propulsion system,

external diameter and wiring are similar to that of the SS-1

Scud B missile, which is slightly longer and more heavy.

Experts conjecture that the M-11's warhead separates during

flight and continues its path to the target, controlled by four

small fins fitted on the rear. It is not known whether these

fins (shown in some photographs) are adjustable or else fixed

to further stabilize the flight path. It is believed that control

during the initial launching/acceleration phase is achieved

via either adjustable surfaces located across the jet stream

or small-sized path-correction boosters. The missile is 7.5m

long, has a trunk diameter of 0.88m and the weight-at-launch

is around 5,000kg.

According to initial information provided by the Chinese,

the missile carries a 500-kg warhead and has a maximum range

of 300km. But newer reports say that the missile's warhead weighs

800kg and that the maximum range is 280km. It is considered

highly likely that both versions are correct, and that these

are variations on the ratio of warhead weight to weight of fuel

payload in line with the revised (1999) MTCR treaty regarding

the non-proliferation of ballistic missiles. According to that

treaty, the maximum range should be 300km and the warhead's

weight should not exceed 500kg.

Another version, with a 500-kg warhead and maximum range

of 400km, is believed to be in development for export to Pakistan

and Iran. Initially the M-11 export series carried an HE single-unit

warhead; but the DF-11 version in operation with the Chinese

military carries a 90kT-strong nuclear warhead. Also available

are warheads carrying sub-munitions, chemical weapons and FAEs.

According to another source, the sub-munitions warhead carries

cluster bombs weighing 5kg each.

Reports further indicate that the missile employs a guidance

system during terminal phase that is possibly similar to that

of the M-9 (CSS-6). The M-11 is also thought to be fitted with

boosters located on the rear part of the warhead. The boosters

serve to correct the warhead's position before re-entry to the

atmosphere and to re-adjust flight path. The first test launch

of an M-11 (CSS-7) was held in 1990, and it is likely the missile

went operational in 1992. Unconfirmed reports said that during

tests the new terminal guidance system displayed lesser precision

and a larger CEP (the best performance was a 600m CEP).

According to other estimates, China possesses 200 such missiles

and plans to raise the number to 500 by the year 2005. There

are also reports that some M-11s, or missile parts, have been

sold to Pakistan and Iran, but China denies this. According

to some sources, 34 M-11s were exported to Pakistan in 1993,

but that they are being stored at an airbase near Lahore. There

is also clear evidence of Chinese assistance in the setting

up of infrastructure for the production of ballistic missiles

near Ravalpidi [name as transliterated]. Lastly, reports indicate

that 30 other M-11s, or parts, were exported to Iran in 1995

with the purpose of setting up an assembly line and later on

a full production line.

DF-11/M-18/CSS-7 Mod 2

The M-18 (DF-11 Mod 2) is a modification of the M-11, which

in turn is based on the Russian-made Scud B. It first appeared

on display at a Beijing aerospace exhibition in 1987 as a two-stage

ballistic missile with a maximum range of 1,000km and capability

of carrying warheads weighing 400-500kg. This missile is considerably

longer (by two meters) than all the others of the M series.

According to western observers, the first test launch was held

on 13 March 1996 at the No 2054 missile base in the Hunan district.

Latest reports indicate that Chinese technicians are working

feverishly on the missile designs in a bid to improve accuracy

through the incorporation of a GPS receiver into the guidance

system (probably using the same procedure) [as published]. The

first official appearance of the M-11, dubbed by American analysts

as the CSS-7 Mod 2, came on 1 October 1999. At the same time

period, Pakistan displayed for the first time at a military

parade two Shaheen missiles that bear an uncanny resemblance

to the Chinese CSS-7 Mod 2 (M-1 . This serves to prove beyond

a shadow of a doubt the relation between the two countries'

projects.

Chronicle of Turkey's missile project

1972: foundation of TUBITAK-SAGE

1987: the G-7 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United

Kingdom and United States) sign the MTCR treaty imposing restrictions

on the spread of missile technology

1988: ROKETSAN is founded

1988: Turkish cooperation with Pakistan. ASR-227, a top-secret

ballistics missiles development project, gets underway

1989: acquisition of specialized test equipment and telemetry

devices from France

04/1990: first test launch of the ASR-227 missile

1991: recruitment of 200 Turkic-origin scientists from the

former Soviet Union. The scientists were specialized in missile

technology and weapons of mass destruction

1992-1994: beginning of new research at TUBITAK-SAGE and

a shift toward Soviet technology

1995: cooperation starts with China and Israel

1/12/1995: application submitted to United States for the

purchase of 120 ATACMs

1995: transport of a SCUD-B launcher from Afghanistan via

Pakistan

10/1996: revealed: a secret agreement with China on the

purchase of a small number of WS-1 launchers and the transfer

of technical know-how for the construction of ballistic missiles

11/1996: signing of an agreement for the purchase of 72

ATACMs from the United States, worth $48 million

13/10/1997: agreement with Israel on joint production of

the Delilah air-launched Cruise missile

7/10/1997: Ocalan affair triggers Turkish-Syrian crisis;

both sides threaten to use ballistic missiles

28/09/1999: first test launch of a missile produced entirely

in Turkey

11/02/2000: first successful test of the Toros 230-A and

Toros 260-A long-range non-guided rockets

6/12/2001: first test launch of a Turkish-made ballistic

missile of a range of 150km

This shocking information has been cross-verified with some other sources, such as the following:

Quote[/b] ]NEW TURKISH MISSILE

U.S. officials last week released a photograph of Turkey’s new J

missile. The missile was tested in December for the first time and will

have a range of 150 kilometers.

The missile is of interest to U.S. intelligence because it believed

to be based on Chinese missile technology. The J missile is intended to

give Turkish military forces a deterrent capability against growing

ballistic missile forces in the region, namely, those of Iran, Iraq and

Syria.

The J missile will be a road mobile surface to surface missile that

is said to be similar in design to China’s M-7. The M-7 is also known as

the Project 8610 missile and is capable of carrying a 500 kilogram

warhead up to 180 kilometers. The M-7 is similar to the U.S. Lance

missile and the Russian SS-21. The M-7 is based on the HQ-2

surface-to-air missile used by China.

Turkey does not plan to extend the range of the J missile beyond the

300 kilometer limit of the Missile Technology Control Regime, U.S.

officials said. (Geo-Strat, 26 Mar 02)

Or this source of information:

Quote[/b] ]further infos (source www.missilethreat.com)

Project J

Country: Turkey

Associated Countries: People’s Republic of China

Class: SRBM

Basing: Surface based

Payload: Single warhead

Warhead: 150 kg; HE

Length: 4.52 m

Diameter: 0.32 m

Launch Weight: 520 kg

Propulsion: Single-stage solid

Range: 150 km

Status: Unknown

In Service: ~2002

Details

Project J is a short-range, ground-based, solid propellant missile system. It is a joint venture between the Turkish firm Roketsan and CPMIEC of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The system is believed to be based upon the PRC WS-1 unguided rocket system. It is presumed that like the WS-1, the Project J is road mobile and deployed in a battery.

The Project J is likely to be deployed as a tactical weapon. Its warhead is insufficient against strategic or hardened targets, even with its accuracy. Project J is based upon the WS-1 missile which was designed to be deployed in volume from rocket batteries. This will probably be the case for the Project J, and it will likely be used as a support weapon against military targets. The addition of a relatively advanced guidance system will increase the effectiveness of the weapon, but is unlikely to be sufficient for use against individual or moving military targets. However, it will likely be able to bombard a military column, airfield or base with a high degree of effectiveness.

The WS-1 has a length of 4.52 m, a diameter of 0.32 m and a launch weight of 520 kg. It is an unguided rocket with a 150 kg warhead and a range of 80 km. The Project J is reported to have a 150 km (92 miles) range and have a combination of inertial guidance and a Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) system equipped on its control fins. This likely gives the missile a relatively high degree of accuracy under 50 m CEP. There is probably a decrease in the payload to get such a significant increase in range.

The Project J missile was first reported in Turkey in 2002. Turkey purchased five WS-1 rocket batteries in 1997, which it likely reverse engineered with the collaboration of CPMIEC to develop the Project J missile. The first flight test of the Project J occurred in December 2001.

************************************

I find this a very worrisome development. Now lets keep all the traditional Greek-Turkish rivalries aside, I find this worrisome for other reasons.

Unlike the aforementioned violations of Greek airpsace, this is actually a real threat to Greece, since if this project comes to fruition, Turkey will possess the ability to strike any target inside Greece within a manner of minutes, and without having to fear reprisals on the same scale. It is too great a threat to have a semi-renegade and semi-stable nation like Turkey (how many juntas did they go through the last 50 years. 3? 4?) to possess such weapons. Since Greece doesn't possess such weapons, they can and should be classified as first-strike weapons.

Secondly, the Turks claim they want to use them to counter the Iranian and Syrian missile threats. I actually partially believe them, but what will Iran and Syria do when they realise that Turkey has a few missiles themselves? Logical choice: you build more missiles, to make sure their missiles are of a retaliatory nature, and not a first-strike nature. The result: an arms race, which is about the last thing you want.

Thirdly, as mentioned before, if the Greek government decides that this is *not* a Casus Belli, then the least they will do is follow Syria's and Iran's example and start an arms race and try developing such missiles herself. Again, the result is (lots) more missiles in the region. I doubt the Israelis would be happy to see Syria, Iran and Greece all starting to increase their missile capabilities.

I believe that these developments will bring further destabilisation to a region which just can not afford any more destabilisation. I sincerely hope that the EU accession talks will force Ankara to stop this project. If Brussels fails doing so, then I can clearly see a Greek First Strike against the facility near Ankara and the start of a war.

Thanks to the United States, a precedent has been set. Unlike Iraq, however, this missile programme is real. EU/Nato/UN approval or not, this programme must stop, and if talks will not make it stop, then cluster bombs will.

[denoir 0]

What is very clear to me is that the EU policy towards Greece-Turkey-Cyprus has been a big clusterfuck for the past 25 years.

One of the most elementary principles of the European Union is: sort out all your conflicts with other nations before you get entry.

Do you think that France is worried when Germany develops a new missile system? Do you think Sweden gets worried if Denmark introduces a new generation of submarines? Do you think Ireland gets paranoid if the UK produces new tanks?

Of course not, and that is how the EU is supposed to work. Not only should there be no conflicts, but there should not be a trace of thought about a conflict with another member state. The EU's primary reason for existance is to guarantee peace in Europe. With its mindset and relations with Turkey, Greece should not have been accepted in 1981, Cyprus shouldn't have been accepted in 2004 and there should be no talks with Turkey now. You really need to clear your problems out.

Such behaviour and such attitudes are simply not acceptable in today's EU.

I know that the plan is that through integration into the EU, the problems will be resolved. I think however it is way too risky and that there should have been a demand that the Turkey-Greece issues be solved before any of the countries were allowed into the Union.

I do have to give Greece partial credit though, it's current government has clearly the position that the problems with Turkey have to be resolved. There is however a nasty streak of nationalism, bordering on showinism in Greek policy and in the media, and that's not good. That and a very nasty case of paranoia (the issue of Macedonia is a good example).

As for Turkey, I really can't say as I'm not informed enough. In the rest of Europe we for obvious reason get far more information from the greek point of view.

Anyway, this is the region I'm most worried with. I think it has the potential of creating a Europe-wide disaster.

[denoir 0]

So you want to see the PM's memos? [bBC]

Quote[/b] ]

Four years in the waiting, the Freedom of Information Act has finally come into full force. But will it really change the way journalists find stories and let the public know what is really going on?

Two years ago I visited the Prime Minister's office. The friendly staff were welcoming to me and Michael Crick, the reporter I was with, and gave us a large pile of Mr Blair's correspondence with other world leaders, which we sat down and read.

But we weren't in Downing Street - we were in Stockholm in the office of the Swedish Prime Minister, Goran Persson.

Sweden has possibly the strongest freedom of information laws in the world, and the government there is happy to make available the sort of documents that other countries like Britain have preferred to keep secret.

The pile of Mr Blair's letters to Mr Persson contained one we found particularly enjoyable. It was sent in the wake of England beating Germany 5-1 in the World Cup qualifiers in 2001, a triumph for the new England manager Sven-Goran Eriksson. Mr Persson was interviewed on BBC Radio 4's Today programme about this boost to Anglo-Swedish relations - following which Tony Blair dispatched him a short handwritten note:

"You are a star," said Mr Blair. "You can appear on British radio anytime. And thank you for Sven."

But when we asked Downing Street for copies of Tony Blair's letters to Goran Persson, we were told they could not release them as it might "damage our international relations". Who was the person who told us this? The Cabinet Office official with the grand title of 'openness co-ordinator'.

Questions being asked

The question journalists are asking themselves now is how will this traditional British tendency to official secrecy change with the Freedom of Information Act ('Foia' in the jargon) in force from 1 January?

That is a critical issue for the public too because it determines what they will ultimately know or not know. The media will be some of the most enthusiastic users of the powerful new rights to government information which the Act lays down. In some cases how much is revealed will still depend on the attitude of civil servants.

Would Mr Blair's international writings on the England football manager now become public?

That will be determined by whether officials think it is more in the public interest to reveal them or to avoid prejudice to our international relations by keeping them secret.

But whatever their inclinations there will be many situations where public authorities will now be forced to reveal documents on request. This will give British journalists the sort of tool that their colleagues elsewhere have made extensive use of for years.

Freedom of information legislation helped the Washington Post report the role played by US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld in assisting Saddam Hussein in the 1980s.

It led to the Irish Times revealing the spiralling costs of a proposed new national stadium in Ireland, resulting in the plan being abandoned. And it enabled a Swedish newspaper to expose how top army officers were regularly breaking the rules on using official vehicles for private journeys.

Sometimes Foia will lead to scoops. Sometimes it will just lead to journalists having more background information. The time delays involved in getting requests dealt with will make it of less use for routine, daily news reporting. But it should be invaluable for longer-term investigations and research.

Corridors of power

If we had already had freedom of information in Britain, who knows how better informed journalism here would have been on topics like the outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease, Gulf War syndrome, the hospital 'superbug' MRSA or even visas for Filipino nannies. Perhaps we will find out, if journalists decide to revisit some of these stories in search of information which they found it difficult to obtain at the time.

And plenty of journalists will certainly be using the Act to try to find out more about the process leading to the Iraq War, particularly the vexed issue of the Attorney-General's legal advice on the legality of the conflict. But it's not only big national issues which Foia will affect. Since it covers some 100,000 public bodies down to local councils, police forces, primary schools and GP surgeries, it could be that it will be the local media which will get the most out of it.

And in the spirit of freedom of information, here's a little advance tip-off for the openness co-ordinator in the Cabinet Office I'm going to be putting in a request for Tony Blair's recent letters to Goran Persson.

This came as quite a surprise to me. I always thought that the EU centrally was the last institution in Europe to adopt a FOI act. As Sweden has had it for 150+ years now, I thought that all the other EU states had something similar.

Apparently not so in UK, Germany and France. This becomes easily abusrd within the context of the EU, where you can't get the a set of documents if you ask French officials directly, but there is no problem requesting them on a union level.

Anyway, in Sweden the open system is IMO a bit too open, in some cases bordering on the invasion of privacy. You can for instance get anybody's school records. You can get transcripts of any e-mail conversations made by somebody on the goverments' payroll (made in their official role of course, but with email there's usally very little distinction - people use the same email address for private use) etc

[kerosene 0]

Hah, britains one of the most secretive countires in the world, our secrecey laws are insane, we have secrets over 100 years old, (presumably where something appaling was done in a british colony.) I dont know how it is in Germany and France, even now, its quite awkward to get stuff under the FOI, you nedd to jump through a few hoops, the U.S freedom of information act makes it look like a joke.

[Tex -USMC- 0]

From Economist.com premium...

Quote[/b] ]Big Dominique and his struggle against the Islamists

Dec 16th 2004 | PARIS

The French interior minister makes the case for being tough on Muslim extremists

IN AMERICAN minds, Dominique de Villepin once embodied French pacifist defiance and soft-on-terrorism Old Europe. As foreign minister, he was the most passionate opponent at the United Nations of the use of force in Iraq. So it may surprise many to find that, as France's interior minister, Mr de Villepin (in the middle of the picture above) is now waging a hardline battle on terror in France, with zero tolerance of radical Islam.

Liberal multiculturalists have long said that secular France is too intolerant to religious minorities, especially its 5m Muslims (the biggest Muslim population in Europe). It is accused of being too rigid in denying religious freedoms in public institutions, and too suspicious of goings-on in mosques. The French ban on the headscarf in state schools was widely condemned in America, Britain and the Netherlands. But since the grisly murder last month of Theo van Gogh, a Dutch film director, more Europeans have asked if there might be a link between laisser-faire multiculturalism and the radicalisation of Muslims. Could excessive tolerance be making it too easy for extremist Islam to organise?

Although he is careful not to criticise multiculturalism in the rest of Europe, Mr de Villepin is unapologetic about France's tough regime. “Terrorists are opportunists,†he says, sitting in his office beside a bust of Napoleon. “They strike where it is easiest.†In his view, Muslim extremism requires good policing and robust laws, but also a strategy. “We need a strong policy to combat radical Islam. It is used as a breeding-ground for terrorism. We cannot afford not to watch them very closely.â€

There are two elements to Mr de Villepin's approach. The first is a rigid, even repressive, intolerance of incitement to violence. When he tried to expel Abdelkader Bouziane, an Algerian cleric in Lyons, who advocated the stoning of women, the decision was overturned by the courts. So Mr de Villepin changed the law—and the imam was on the next plane home. Religious-hatred laws were also behind this week's court decision to ban al-Manar, a Lebanese satellite-television station close to Hizbullah, Lebanon's Iranian-inspired “Party of Godâ€.

To help his campaign, Mr de Villepin has an intelligence network, with Arabic expertise and a legal arsenal, that long predates September 11th 2001. France has two domestic intelligence agencies: the Renseignements Généraux, an intelligence-gathering service, and the Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire, a counter-intelligence agency. Agents keep a close eye on prayer places in France, which number 1,685, according to the RG. Of these, about 50 are considered “radicalâ€. Mr Bouziane had long been tracked. Mr de Villepin is now setting up special cells around the country to monitor fast-food joints, halal butchers, specialist bookshops and telephone call-centres, any of which might be fronts or recruitment points. A pilot effort in Paris has led to the expulsion of 14 extremists, including seven imams.

The French criminal-justice system makes a crackdown easy. Terrorist suspects can be held for 96 hours without charge. Under a 1996 law, they can be detained by a judge for “association with wrongdoers involved in a terrorist enterpriseâ€: this covers not just conspirators, but those in their circle. Since January 2004, several members of the Benchellali family have been held on such charges, linked to plans for a chemical bomb. All four French suspects released from Guantánamo Bay, one of them a Benchellali, were detained on their return home. “We have a particularly repressive criminal-justice regime,†deplores one of their lawyers. As many as 35% of prisoners in France are in “provisional detention†awaiting trial, a process that can take years.

In other countries, this might be a subject for liberal hand-wringing. But the detention of the Guantánamo Bay four provoked little comment in France. Most people in France see it as a price to pay to protect liberal society. “We must never find ourselves in a position of powerlessness,†insists Mr de Villepin. “Democratic governments must ensure order, as this is the guarantee of our freedoms.†Far from prompting debate on the balance between civil liberties and security, Mr de Villepin's approach has been applauded—and his popularity has risen, encouraging those who see him as the next prime minister.

The second part of Mr de Villepin's struggle is one that Libération, a left-leaning newspaper, calls “drowning the beardsâ€. His predecessor as interior minister, Nicolas Sarkozy, argued that radical Islam was best tamed by co-option. But Mr de Villepin wants to dilute this by promoting moderates. Mr Sarkozy created the French Council of the Muslim Faith, an official body now dominated by hardliners. Mr de Villepin prefers a “Muslim foundationâ€, in which mosque-based representatives are balanced by secular or moderate Muslims. Since less than 10% of French Muslims are practising, he argues, their representatives should reflect this. His foundation would aim to bring openness to the financing of mosques, much of which comes from Arabs abroad.

Mr de Villepin, a romantic neo-Gaullist, biographer of Napoleon and poetic defender of his country's gloire, is also keen to reaffirm French values. To this end, he wants France to train imams. Of the country's 1,200 or so Muslim clerics, he says, three-quarters are not French, and a third do not even speak French. From next September he plans to offer courses to imams in theology and “secularismâ€: law, civics and French institutions, as well as the French language. And Mr de Villepin hopes to supply more Muslim chaplains to prisons. It is illegal to collect official figures on religion in France, but it is reckoned that a majority of the country's prison population is Muslim. Recruitment to radical Islam behind bars is a growing worry.

Plenty of questions about these plans remain. Why would foreign financiers, from Saudi Arabia or elsewhere, pay cheques via a foundation? Since courses for imams cannot be compulsory, what is the incentive for them to learn about France's republican code? Given the popularity of Arabic classes at mosques, would imams want to learn French?

Nor does it follow that countries that favour multiculturalism, such as Britain, cannot also support rigorous policing and counter-intelligence work against radical Islam. France may have less compunction about asserting its values, but the trade-off between security and liberty is still a challenge. Yet at a time when all of Europe is grappling with Islamic radicalism, Mr de Villepin's approach will be studied with interest—even, perhaps, in America.

[ralphwiggum 6]

http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/europe/01/23/ukraine/index.html

Quote[/b] ]KIEV, Ukraine -- Viktor Yushchenko has been sworn in as Ukraine's new president, closing a tumultuous chapter for the country.

Months of protests and political dispute followed a fraud-plagued election, but Yushchenko won a court-ordered rerun in December and was inaugurated in Kiev on Sunday.

Yushchenko read the presidential oath in the Ukraine parliament, placing his hand on a copy of the constitution and an antique Bible.

Looking on were members of parliament and hundreds of guests, including U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell and presidents of seven countries.

After the oath, some deputies repeatedly called out "Yush-chen-ko, Yush-chen-ko," an echo of the chanting that filled Kiev during the protest demonstrations.

But others stood still, refusing to applaud, a reflection of the deep divisions Yushchenko will face as the country's third post-Soviet leader.

Yushchenko has pledged to steer Ukraine on a new course, fighting corruption and bringing the former Soviet republic closer to the European Union and NATO while maintaining good relations with Russia.

[EiZei 0]

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4215391.stm

Quote[/b] ]

Spanish monkey ad sparks furore

Poster encouraging young Spaniards to turn out for the European Constitution vote

The Spanish Student Union finds the poster "insulting"

With less than a month to go before Spain holds the EU's first referendum on the European Constitution, not everyone is happy with the campaign.

A row has erupted over an advert for Referendum Plus - a canned drink.

It is being handed out to people under 34 with the claim that it can inspire them to turn out on 20 February.

The poster, put out by the government-funded Youth Council, shows a monkey turning into a voter after downing the contents of the can.

Referendum Plus, it claims, will end the apathy that has long dogged European elections.

"This drink could change your life," reads the caption. "Thanks to its stimulating action against fatigue, you'll go out and vote."

The article itself is rather non-important but there was this one thing that catched my eye:

Quote[/b] ]

December 2004 poll on Spanish EU Constitution awareness

84% don't know what's in the European Constitution

55% believe it will be good for Spain

50% believe it will benefit the autonomous regions

Support for "yes" - down at 42%

Support for "no" / undecided / won't say - up at 38%

This is EXCATLY why referendums should not be held on things like this.

On a related note, according to a recent study one third of the finns have not even heard about the constitution and some people here are already demanding a vote.

[Ex-RoNiN 0]

Quote[/b] ]Associated Press

Greek GDP Grows 4 Percent in the 4Q

02.14.2005, 06:33 AM

Greece's fourth-quarter gross domestic product grew 4 percent on the year, making it one of the fastest growing economies in the European Union, the National Statistics Service said Monday.

Greek GDP had grown 3.8 percent in the third quarter of 2004. A year earlier, GDP grew 4.5 percent in the fourth quarter of 2003 - spurred on by Olympic construction projects.

The Greek government had forecast average GDP growth in 2004 at 3.7 percent and at 3.9 percent in 2005. The unexpected higher growth makes it one of the EU's most robust economies. European gross domestic product has been growing at just 2 percent per year.

Last Thursday, a government spokesman said that it was unlikely Greece would meet its 2005 target, but he didn't provide a new estimate.

The European Commission and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development both predicted last month that Greek GDP was slowing to 3.25 percent next year before picking up again in 2006.

Domestic consumption grew 3.4 percent in the fourth quarter on the year, down from 4.3 percent in the third quarter and 3.6 percent in the third quarter of last year.

Public investment grew 4.2 percent in the fourth quarter compared with 2.6 percent in the third quarter and 15 percent in the fourth quarter a year earlier. That slowdown reflects the end of spending on Olympic Games-related investment.

Exports rose 5.3 percent in the fourth quarter, down from 7.9 percent in the third quarter, but up from 1.4 percent in the fourth quarter of 2003. Imports rose 3.1 percent in the fourth quarter, down from 5.9 percent in the third quarter and 8.4 percent in the fourth quarter of 2003.

Source: http://www.forbes.com/work/feeds/ap/2005/02/14/ap1823449.html

Good to see that the Olympics didn't cripple us financially Exports up, Imports down, as it should be. It is also an indicator that the global economy is doing well, since shipping is our major income, and more money through shipping means our merchant fleet is in use a lot more, meaning an increased traffic in commodities.

I reckon GDP will rise strongly next summer when people realise that the anti-Greek propaganda of the Anglo-Saxon press was nothing but rubbish and people come for summer holidays to Greece again. Hopefully, the hotel managers will have learned their lesson (their price hikes were as disgusting as the crap printed on CNN/BBC/et al) and reduced prices a bit...it should be a great experience for visitors actually, seeing how the infrastructure is all modernised and stuff.

[theavonlady 2]

Any news on what happened yesterday? Why so hush-hush?

Quote[/b] ]Noted Paris Theater Gutted by Blast

Sun Feb 13, 5:06 PM ET Europe - AP

By SAMANTHA BORDES, Associated Press Writer

PARIS - An explosion ripped through a well-known Paris theater Sunday morning, gutting its first two floors and slightly injuring seven people, officials said.

The cause of the blast at the 3,000-seat Theatre de l'Empire, or Empire Theater, near the Champs-Elysee was not immediately known. Interior Minister Dominique de Villepin said nothing was being excluded. He did not address the possibility of a terrorist attack.

Seven people, primarily passers-by, suffered minor injuries in the explosion, mostly scrapes from shards of glass and shock to the eardrums, said Olivier Delplace, spokesman for rescue workers. Two watchmen inside the building were among those slightly injured, police said.

Authorities rushed to the scene shortly after 6:30 a.m.

Police used sniffer dogs to try to determine the origin of the blast and to ensure that no one remained trapped in the theater or in surrounding buildings. The occupants of a neighboring six-story apartment block were able to escape without assistance.

Built in the 1920s, the theater had served in recent years as a venue for concerts, dinners and fashion shows. Designer John Galliano was to present his ready-to-wear collection there March 5.

The theater had been sold several years ago to private investors with plans to transform it into a luxury hotel, Girard said.

In its prime, the Empire Theater was a noted music hall for jazz stars and the likes of actor, crooner and dancer Maurice Chevalier.

[ran 0]

The first division of the Judicial Police is investigating.

The main hypothesis are a gas leak, the storing of dangerous materials on a building site inside the theater. The criminal track isn't completely abandonned though.

The Théatre de l'Empire is a pretty negligible event hall in spite of the rest of the Parisian theaters and halls that's why it hasn't really made the headlines.

To make it short : nobody died = nobody gives a fuck It's already been dismissed by most frenchmen as a simple gas leak which has unfortunately been ignited.

[theavonlady 2]

It's already been dismissed by most frenchmen as a simple gas leak which has unfortunately been ignited.

Quote[/b] ]http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L13720984.htm

An initial inquiry by workers from French gas company Gaz de France appeared to rule out a gas leak.

"The building is not supplied with gas, and there was no call because of the smell of gas," a Gaz de France spokeswoman said. "Measurements taken at the theatre did not detect any trace of gas."

Who do you work for, Ran?  

[ran 0]

A theater is quite a large thing and there would need to be a huge gas leak for anybody in the neighborhood to smell it. The building itself may not have been supplied with gas but the GDF engineers aren't infallible And it was just an "initial" inquiry based on a few mesurements on the fly and a little check up of the neighboring gas terminals.

A couple of years ago, a suicidal person took one of his neighboor in hostage, attempting a suicide by cops ... we kindly asked the GDF people to cut the gas as a precaution ... they told us they did but when we went in, there was a pan with a couple of eggs frying on a gas cooker .

-edit-: and no the gas cooker wasn't linked to a gas can but directly on the urban newtork